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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK ON NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS
EFFECTS AND COUNTERMEASURES
by
Arman Sargolzaei
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Kang K. Yen, Major Professor
In recent years, the security of networked control systems (NCSs) has been an important
challenge for many researchers. Although the security schemes for networked control
systems have advanced in the past several years, there have been many acknowledged
cyber attacks. As a result, this dissertation proposes the use of a novel time-delay switch
(TDS) attack by introducing time delays into the dynamics of NCSs. Such an attack has
devastating effects on NCSs if prevention techniques and countermeasures are not
considered in the design of these systems. To overcome the stability issue caused by TDS
attacks, this dissertation proposes a new detector to track TDS attacks in real time. This
method relies on an estimator that will estimate and track time delays introduced by a
hacker. Once a detector obtains the maximum tolerable time delay of a plant’s optimal
controller (for which the plant remains secure and stable), it issues an alarm signal and
directs the system to its alarm state. In the alarm state, the plant operates under the
control of an emergency controller that can be local or networked to the plant and
remains in this stable mode until the networked control system state is restored.
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In another effort, this dissertation evaluates different control methods to find out which
one is more stable when under a TDS attack than others. Also, a novel, simple and
effective controller is proposed to thwart TDS attacks on the sensing loop (SL). The
modified controller controls the system under a TDS attack. Also, the time-delay
estimator will track time delays introduced by a hacker using a modified model
reference-based control with an indirect supervisor and a modified least mean square
(LMS) minimization technique.
Furthermore, here, the demonstration proves that the cryptographic solutions are
ineffective in the recovery from TDS attacks. A cryptography-free TDS recovery (CFTDSR) communication protocol enhancement is introduced to leverage the adaptive
channel redundancy techniques, along with a novel state estimator to detect and assist in
the recovery of the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks. The conclusion shows how the
CF-TDSR ensures the control stability of linear time invariant systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

General Statement of Problem Area

Control systems have many applications in the industry. An innovation in control systems
is the networked control system (NCS), which is used to monitor and control systems in
wide areas, enabling engineers to more easily configure, monitor and control devices. In
recent years, the security of networked control systems has been an important challenge
for many researchers. Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) include Networked Control
Systems (NCSs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Process Control
Systems (PCSs), Distributed Control Systems (DCSs), Load Frequency Control (LFC)
and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). Security of the abovementioned ICSs plays
an important role in the successful performance of industrial and critical infrastructures.
Energy and power sectors, transportation system sectors, water and wastewater system
sectors, healthcare and public health sectors are examples of industries facing a high
probability of attacks on their performance. Along with the development and
advancement of security schemes for control systems during the past several years, there
have also been many cyber attacks. This is evidence that control systems are not very
secure in light of cyber attacks.
The following is a summary of several attacks that occurred in control systems in various
industries:
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•

The energy and power industry is one of the most important industries in the
world, which demands high security. Any failure in security of this industry will
cause catastrophic damage to society. Many past and ongoing research efforts
attempt to make this industry tech smart and globalized in terms of control and
monitoring. The blackout in India in August 2012, and North American blackout
in 2003 have brought serious attention the immediate needs of new schemes to
prevent the occurrence of cyber attacks. [1, 2]

•

Water and wastewater systems clean all of the waste and harmful microscopic
viruses in our water supply sphere. In January 2000, an incident of attack on a
sewage control system in Australia was reported. During a four-month period,
these problems eventually led to the flooding of the grounds of a nearby hotel, a
park, and a river with a million liters of sewage. [3]

•

The natural gas industry has also been targeted by attackers. In 2000, the Russian
Interior Ministry recorded attacks to their control systems. The hacker accessed
the control system that regulates gas flow [4].

•

Transportation systems are expanding quickly. Hackers can attack the control
systems in this industry and make them harmful and dangerous. Currently, train
tramway tracks are wireless and remote-controlled. In 2008, a teenager modified a
TV remote, resulting in four derailments and many injuries [5].

•

Biomedical devices usually involve control systems. The proper use of these
devices is a critical necessity in the public health industry. Recently, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security underscored some threats affecting almost 300
medical devices. Wireless devices such as pacemakers are a possible target of
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attack. The false data injection, denial of service, and other types of attacks pose
as dangerous threats to patients.
Traditionally, control systems are designed in normal environments, with no attacks
involved in the design process. In this case, any distortion, delay or attack to any part of
control systems such as sensors, communication lines and others, can result in an
unstable system or even failure of the system.
Currently, industries use security algorithms that were introduced by IT researchers,
which stand the chance of not working efficiently or properly for the networked control
systems under a TDS attack. Hence, control systems are in need of hardware and
software protection protocol.
Based on the information above, security analyses of NCSs could improve our
understanding of the possible effects and results of cyber attacks. Also, the design and
implementation of safe, robust and secure controller and communication protocol could
ensure the reliability of industries that use networked control systems. The goal of this
research is to study and analyze different types of attacks, in particular, the Time-Delay
Switch (TDS) attack on the NCS, as well as to drive the general model of the system
under TDS attacks. This research also proposes a new robust controller for the network
control systems experiencing a TDS attack. The new controller overcomes the stability
issues caused by TDS attacks. Furthermore, an attack-resistant communication protocol is
implemented to guarantee the stability of networked control systems experiencing a TDS
attack.
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1.2

Problem Statement and Research Questions

The research for the development of a robust and stable automated networked control
system that will resist cyber attacks consists of the following tasks:
1.

The current networked control systems were designed under normal operations,

with no attacks included in the design process. It is necessary to outline a reliable and
general model for a system under a TDS attack, and then design the robust controllers.
2.

Investigating the effects of attacks on the stability of systems under a TDS attack

is a difficult task because an attack can occur at any time interval and can be a random
process.
3.

Attackers can target wireless, fiber or other type of communication medium and

disrupt the system. An attacker can access the communication channel and cause a denial
of service, or cause a delay, as well as a data jam or an injection of fault data into the
system. In this case, the controller either does not obtain sensor information or receives
wrong data in the decision-making process.
4.

Since an attack is a random event, determining an appropriate protocol, technique,

and software package for estimating and detecting the type of attack is complicated.
5.

Separating a TDS attack from a natural delay and disturbance is a difficult task.

Following is a summary of the research questions:
•

Is it necessary to study the stability of networked control systems experiencing a
TDS attack?
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•

Can TDS attacks be detected and tracked in real time for linear systems?

•

Is it possible to design a secure and robust controller to overcome the effects of
TDS attacks for NCSs?

•

Is it possible to design a secure communication protocol between controllers and
plants for a system experiencing a TDS attack?

1.3

Dissertation Roadmap

The five main research themes of this dissertation can be described as follows:
 Introducing a new type of attack on NCSs called a “TDS attack” and showing that
this attack can disturb and disable a NCS.
 Detecting and tracking TDS attacks in real time, alerting the controller center, and
using the emergency controller design.
 Proposing a new controller design to overcome the stability effects of TDS
attacks.
 Proposing a new communication protocol to solve the stability and effects of TDS
attacks on NCSs.
 Evaluation of a controller’s methods to find the best existing controller design for
nonlinear NCSs experiencing TDS attacks.
Accordingly, this dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a general definition of a NCS and its applications. It follows with a
discussion on NCS security challenges and the different types of attacks on NCS.
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Furthermore, this chapter includes a general model of attacks for NCS, along with
relevant literature related to NCS security and the different type of attacks.
Chapter 3 examines the effects of natural time delays in control systems. The first
section provides time-delay effects and solutions for controlling a three-phase single
stage current source boost inverter. The second section discusses an optimal control
problem with time delay and presents the design complexity of the controller and effects
of ignoring time delays in the cost function result.
Chapter 4 introduces a new type of attack on NCS called the time-delay switch (TDS)
attack. It provides a stability analysis of a NCS experiencing a TDS attack. It also shows
how TDS attacks can cause stability issues on two real-world applications. One is the
networked power control systems, which is the Load Frequency Control (LFC) on smart
grid applications. The second one involves biomedical application. It provides simulation
results of TDS attacks on wireless pacemakers by understanding the dynamic model of
the system.
Chapter 5 includes a literature review about research dealing with the natural time delays
of control systems. It also contains a new method that detects and tracks real-time TDS
attacks on NCS. At the end of this chapter, simulation results display the power of this
method on LFC applications.
Chapter 6 details a simple proposed control method to overcome stability issues of TDS
attacks on linear NCS. Simulation results of a sample complex example and LFC on two
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interconnected power areas show that this controller can prevent stability and inefficiency
effects of TDS attacks on NCS.
Chapter 7 describes the Emotional Learning Controller (ELC) in detail. It also evaluates
ELC’s robustness and stability when compared with two other controllers under a TDS
attack. It also introduces a local and emergency controller design for a NCS under a TDS
attack.
Chapter 8 provides a new, simple communication protocol that does not need encryption
techniques. This chapter proposes a protocol called “CF-TDSR” in order to address
issues caused by a TDS attack on a NCS. It also includes simulation results of using the
CF-TDSR protocol on an LFC system under a TDS attack.
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation with a discussion on the findings and implications
for potential future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DESIGN FUNDAMENTALS
2.1

Networked Control Systems

A Networked Control System (NCS) is a control system in which the control feedback
process is closed through a real-time communication network [6]. In this case, the control
system can be shared with other nodes outside the control system. Figure 2.1 shows a
typical NCS. In this figure, sensors measure the output signal from the plant and transmit
it through the communication channels to the controller. Then, the controller compares
the signals with the reference values and injects the control signals into the plant.

Figure 2.1: A Typical Networked Control System

NCSs are of pervasive use in the industry and are an integral part of any infrastructure.
They are the information communication and control highway. NCSs are sometimes
referred to as industrial control systems, industrial control networks, command and
control networks, distributed control systems, or the World Wide Web, depending on the
application and context. Technological advances in communication and control made it
possible to monitor and control many systems over a wide geographical area. This is the
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essence of NCSs that makes it easier for engineers to configure, monitor, and control
devices from a distance, and make it possible to coordinate the operations of a large and
distributed infrastructure with ease and efficiency.
As previously stated, NCSs have many applications [6] in the industry, including the
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Process Control System (PCS),
Distributed Control System (DCS), Load Frequency Control (LFC), and Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC). Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) play an important role in the
protection of industrial and critical infrastructures, such as the energy and power sector,
transportation systems sector, water and wastewater systems sector, healthcare and public
health sector, etc. Hence, the security of the controllers is very important.

In the

following sections, the focus will be on the security and stability of NCSs.
2.2

Challenges for Networked Control Systems

In recent years, the security and stability of NCSs has been at the center stage for
researchers, engineers, and governmental entities, since exploited security risks could
have potential catastrophic consequences [7, 8]. Although the security and stability
schemes for NCSs have advanced in the past several years, there have been many
acknowledged cyber attacks and confirmations that these control systems are not very
safe and stable in the face of attacks and natural disturbances.
A survey of literature indicates that the study and improvement of the security of NCSs is
necessary. The first key problem of conventional control systems is that they were
designed in a normal environment with no attacks considered. In this case, any attack to
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any part of a control system, such as sensors and communication links, can drive the
system to an unstable mode and cause inefficiency.
There are many researchers that have studied these problems. A class of False Data
Injection (FDI) attacks that bypassed the bad data detection in SCADA systems was
proposed by [9]. In [10], adversaries launched FDI attacks against state estimates of
power systems, with only the knowledge of the perturbed model of the power system. Y.
Mo et al. [9] studied FDI attacks on a control system equipped with a Kalman filter. In
[11], the smallest set of hacker-controlled meters was identified

as performing an

unobservable attack. Recently, Amin et al. [12] considered the Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks on the communication channels in the measurements telemetered in remote
terminal units (RTUs) sent to the control center of power systems. They demonstrated
that a hacker may make power systems unstable by properly designing DoS-attack
sequences. Liu et al. [13] considered how a switched-DoS attack on a smart grid can
affect the dynamic performance of its power systems. The Viking projects [14]
considered cyber attacks on the Load Frequency Control (LFC), one of a few automatic
control loops in SCADA power systems. They analyzed the impacts of cyber attacks on
the control centers of power systems by using reachability methods. However, they only
considered attacks on the control centers, which are usually harder to attack than the
communication channels in the SL of a power system.
The above literature review talked about current problems and existing attacks. Also, it
explained how different researchers attempt to solve them. However, in papers that
described attacks to NCS, not much research has been done on the making the design of
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the controller more robust and optimal. In [12], a NCS under a DOS attack is modeled.
They used the stochastic control theory to secure the system, but only the LTI model was
studied.
Another key problem in network control systems is that there are no solid methods that
prevent attackers from hacking controllers, wireless sensors, reference inputs, etc.
Currently, industries use security algorithms to secure their control networks. These
algorithms were introduced by IT researchers in the context of the World Wide Web,
where there is no mandate for real-time data. Therefore, the security of NCSs cannot be
guaranteed when using those algorithms. This problem, along with existing, relevant
literature, is addressed in detail in Chapter 8.
2.3

Time-Delay Estimation

This dissertation focuses on stability issues caused by time delays on control systems.
There are many studies on time-delay estimation, all of which have limitations. Tan [15]
developed two different time varying time-delay estimation methods for nonlinear
systems using neural networks. The first method is an indirect time-delay estimator
procedure using nonlinear programming. The second one is a direct time-delay estimation
scheme that uses a neural network to construct a time-delay estimator. The methods
proposed by the author show that his/her method is more general and accurate than the
simple linear time-delay estimation procedures [16, 17] for time-varying time-delay
signals. However, the methods proposed are complex, and the estimation process takes
time to obtain results. Examination of their results shows that it is obvious that the
algorithm took 80 sec to estimate and learn a 4-sec time-delay value. Also, their methods
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were not used in the context of real-time control. Furthermore, to train the neural
network, the authors used a specific pattern of input, or a combination of sinusoids, to
achieve a good estimation function.
It should be noted that the time-delay calculation procedure, either by the neural network
or the nonlinear programming method, is done offline before the algorithms are applied
to estimate a real-time varying signal.
The method works well in estimating a slowly varying time delay (the time delay was
modeled by a ramp function to force the neural network to learn it slowly), but fails when
tested with switched time-delay attack (e.g. step time delay).
2.4

Different Types of Attacks on NCS
This section introduces a generalized attack model and illustrates it for the most

important attacks in detail. Later in this chapter, the most common attacks on NCSs are
described in detail. Let us consider a NCS (f, g) with controller h as shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Generalized Cyber Attacks on a Typical NCS.
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The system with the controller and the communication channel can be described
concisely as an output feedback system having the following form:
x = f (t , x, u )
y = g ( x)

(2.1)

where f is a function describing the plant behavior, x is the plant state vector and u is the
control vector. The function, g, describes the plant output and the communication
methodology used. The controller is described as:
u = h( y )

(2.2)

where y is the information communicated to the controller about the plant state. The
function h is describing the controller.
An attack on the control system involves altering any component of the NCS. A general
attack can be described as a function that alters any of the components of the system:
~
~
~
( f , g~ , h , ~
x, ~
y , u~ , t ) = Λ ( f , g , h, x, y , u , t )
~

(2.3)

~

where ( f , g~, h , ~x , ~y , u~, ~t ) are the corrupted functions and information as result of the attack
Λ.
The following are the most possible attacks on the NCS, especially on the Networked
Power Control System (NPCS):
I.

Denial of Service (DoS)

This attack seeks to sabotage a NCS by overwhelming its communication and
computational resources in order to prevent it from working [18]. This attack can be
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applied to multiple layers in a NCS. This type of attack can take place between the plant
and the controller. The DoS can disconnect service or data from the plant to the
controller, from the controller to the plant, or both at the same time. In the general model
of attacks, this attack can be described as follows:
 y otherwise
~
y =
attack
α

(2.4)

where α can be zero, or some random value.
II.

Fault Analysis Attack

This class of attack injects faults into a device performing some type of computation.
These faults can be anything from unusual environmental conditions (increased heat, for
example), the injection of a laser beam at the appropriate frequency [19], or the injection
of data packets that collide with legitimate packets [20]. The work of Yuan and Liu et al.
showed that the load redistribution attack [21-23] is a false data injection attack by
modifying selected information in a SCADA power system. This attack is especially
dangerous due to it being able to manipulate the estimation of a system power flow.
Depending on whether the attack is short-term or long-term, it can have damaging effects
on the security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) price estimation [22]. This attack
can be modeled as follows:
 y otherwise
~
y=
attack
z

(2.5)

where z is an input signal designed by the attacker for the purpose of either misleading
the control system, causing system inefficiencies, or sabotaging it.
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III.

Physical Layer Attacks

One only needs to connect to the communication channel rather than the actual network
to launch this attack [24]. Channel jamming attacks become one of the most efficient
ways that attackers use, and are one of the most dangerous for utilities and customers
alike. Examples of such attacks include the continuous emission and injection of high
power wave tones and FM modulated noise into the communication channel at a brute
force level. A more sophisticated attack is detailed by the work of Proano and Lazos,
wherein they exploit specific weaknesses in communications protocols (in their case,
TCP) to perform their attacks [25]. Their selective jamming attack sees the hacker
classifying packets in real time, decoding the control field at the MAC layer, and
corrupting them before the end of their transmissions.
IV.

MAC Layer Attacks

The Media Access Control (MAC) layer is responsible for two-way communication and
is susceptible to attackers who wish to modify parameters, which gives the attacker better
leeway in accessing the network at the cost of degrading network performance for
legitimate customers on the same channel [24]. Examples include spoofing attacks, which
can target both network availability and integrity. One way this attack may be realized is
through sending fake Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) messages and packets into the
local area network. The attacker’s MAC address becomes associated with the IP address
of a legitimate host, causing traffic meant for the host to go to the hacker [26].
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V.

Network/Transport Layer Attack

TCP/IP protocols are said to be the two more vulnerable standards in the network
infrastructure, due to the use of email as the communication media [24, 27]. Traffic
flooding and worm attacks through the internet have led to serious performance issues
[24]. Buffer flooding attacks through the DNP3 protocol were examined in the literature
[28, 29]. The work of East et al. saw the creation of a taxonomy of such attacks, which
can range from sending fake DNP3 messages in order to reset, manipulate, or corrupt
data from a substation [30].
VI.

Application Layer Attack

Application layer attacks seek to exhaust the resources of a communication channel,
focusing on transmission bandwidth in computers and routers [24]. These attacks seek to
limit the bandwidths of CPU’s and I/O’s of connected devices. The work of Ranjan et al.
saw the study and categorization of a number of such attacks. A flood attack sends
requests at higher than normal frequencies, while asymmetrical attacks send highworkload requests. A one-shot attack involves the attacker spreading the workload over
multiple sessions, using HTTP floods to stress the servers over time [31].
VII.

Decryption Attacks

This attack is used to discover the encryption key of a network in order to connect to it
and steal its data. An attacker may do this by accessing and obtaining the physical frames
of the network, and storing enough of them so they can be decrypted by using correct
algorithms [32]. Another form of attack that yields success is called the “side channel
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attack.” This attack exploits some aspect of a physical system that employs a data
encryption algorithm [32].
VIII.

Electromagnetic Attacks

These attacks deal with discerning the encoded plaintext of a power line message through
the leakage of electromagnetic radiation [19].
These attacks use special probes placed at various locations along the unit or circuit in
question. The probe location depends on detecting direct or unintentional emissions.
Direct emissions are intentional current flows through a line, where short currents burst
with sharp rising edges, which can cause large bandwidths [33]. Unintentional emissions
are those electromagnetic leakages that couple to those of other circuit components or
cabling. These emissions are typically modulations of the carrier signals that are either
present or have been introduced into the device. Under these definitions, direct emissions
are the more difficult of the two to detect, requiring close proximity to the device in
question. An attacker would likely prefer the unintentional emissions, as these provide a
wide spectrum of signals to probe and through which encryption keys in the data may be
found [33, 34].
Many proofs of the concept have been demonstrated in the laboratory. The work of Enev
and Gupta [35] experimented on the information leakage from eight televisions
connected to the same power line. It was found that the radiative interference patterns of
TV power supplies yielded discernible information about the media being played. The
work of Hayashi et al. [36-38] demonstrated the viability of obtaining secret keys from
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the radiation patterns of power and communication cables attached to FPGA boards.
Their work showed that cryptographic key information may leak from a near field [36]
and far field [37] radiation patterns.
IX.

Power Analysis Attacks

Power analysis attacks are characterized by analyzing the use of the electrical power of a
device while it performs an encryption algorithm [39]. They are divided into two classes,
simple and differential. Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks observe the data visually
(oscilloscope, for example), and interpret what cryptographic algorithm the signal has
been encoded with. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) applies statistical error-correcting
algorithms to SPA by monitoring trends in the data. DPA attacks are especially
dangerous, as they can be so precise that even the switching of a transistor can give away
an encryption key. All cryptographic algorithms, and devices running them, have so far
been shown to be vulnerable to DPA [39].
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CHAPTER 3
NATURAL TIME DELAY IN CONTROL SYSTEMS, EFFECTS AND
SOLUTIONS
3.1

Time-Delay Effects on a Three-Phase Current Source Boost Inverter

Sustainable Energy (SE) is the future energy source [40]. However, in order to use SE
sources efficiently, it is necessary to integrate them into a power grid. Inverters and
electronic circuits are needed for this purpose [41]. These interface electronic circuits are
recognized as the SE inverters. The SE inverters should convert Direct Current (DC) to
Alternating Current (AC) with as little harmonic content as possible. To do so, they
should be designed to harmonize their outputs with the utility grid line.
There are many different topologies for SE inverters, such as Current Source Boost
Inverters (CSBIs) [42-44], Voltage Source Inverters (VSIs) [45], multi-level inverters
[46, 47], and matrix converters [48, 49]. VSIs have many advantages and been used in
many industrial applications [50]. However, despite other types of inverters, CSBIs can
invert and boost currents in a single stage from a DC source, such as photovoltaic cells to
an AC voltage [51]. This advantage recognizes CSBIs as one of the best choices for SE
grid-connected conversion systems.
In this section, the switching pattern and circuit topology of the three-phase CSBI
proposed in [52] are considered. The suggested CSBI offers a better robust method in
terms of the control of the voltage and the injected power based on a novel switching
pattern.
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Despite the advantage, the proposed CSBI does not consider the time-delay effects of
hardware, software and components on grid synchronization. Furthermore, results show
more harmonics and less current waveform quality.
Most of the inverters can be controlled with digital signal processors (DSPs). DSPs offer
high performance in feedback control, as well as user flexibility for design and
implementation. However, a time delay exists in the electronic components and
microprocessors. In a DSP system, there is a predictable effecting time delay in each
sampling cycle [53]. This delay has a significant effect on switching control, monitoring
and feedback control of the CSBI [52].
In this effort, the focus is on the time-delay effect on a grid-connected CSBI with a recent
literature switching pattern. This section is organized as follows: Section 3.1.1 discusses
the SVPWM-based switching pattern for a grid-connected three-phase current source
inverter and circuit topology proposed by [52]. Then, the effect of time delays on
DSPACE is shown and the proposed technique to overcome this issue is discussed.
Section 3.1.3 will show the results using the proposed technique, which produces less
harmonic and higher waveform quality, followed by the conclusion.

3.1.1

Switching Pattern and Control of CSBI

A. Switching Pattern
The Current Source Boost Inverter (CBSI) topology is illustrated in Figure 3-1, based on
the modified Space-Vector PWM technique, called the “SVPWM.” A detailed
description of the developed switching pattern is presented in [52].
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Figure 3.1: CSBI and its Controller Configuration

In [54], the capability of this technique is demonstrated specifically for controlling the
active and reactive powers effectively. The main purpose of the switching pattern is to
inject in-phase sinusoidal currents into the three phases of the grid, whereas the dc
inductor current is kept at a constant, desired level. In terms of the SVPWM method, in
order to achieve an effective operation, six sections in each grid voltage cycle are
proposed in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Sectors of the Proposed Switching for CSB
In each section, there is one charging stage by keeping the switches on to store energy in
the dc link inductor, and two discharging stages by applying the two line-to-line voltages
to the output of the inverter to inject the stored energy into the grid. The inductor current
increases and output currents are supplied by Cs. In Stages II and III shown in Figure 3.3
(b) and (c), the inductor current discharges through Cs, in which the two line-to-line
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voltages Vab and Vac are applied to the inverter, respectively. Since phase “a” is common
between these two stages, this phase is used for the charging stage.
The switching pattern on all sectors can be found in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1. Here t c is
the charging time; t d 1 and t d 2 are the time intervals of discharging. The relationship of
these time intervals yields
Ts = t c + t d 1 + t d 2

(3.1)

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 3.3: Three stages of different switching patterns for CSB (a) Stage I. (b) Stage II. (c) Stage III
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These time intervals must satisfy the following objectives: (i) The inverter output current
contains minimum harmonic contents, and (ii) the dc-link inductor current stays at a fixed
level.

Figure 3.4: Three Stages for Different Switching
Table 3.1: The Switching Patterns

Section
U1
U2
Sw1
Sw2
Sw3
Sw4
Sw5
Sw6

I
vab
vac
Ts
tc
0
td1
0
td2

II
vac
vbc
td1
0
td2
0
tc
Ts

III
vbc
vba
0
td2
Ts
tc
0
td1

IV
vba
vca
tc
Ts
td1
0
td2
0

V
vca
vcb
0
td1
0
td2
Ts
tc

VI
vcb
vab
td2
0
tc
Ts
td1
0

As a result, if vab = 6Vrms cos(ωt ) measured as the reference signal for this method, the
duty cycles of the two discharging and one charging time intervals are computed as
follows:
(3.2)

d 1 = m co s( ω t − α 0 )

d 2 = m cos(ω t − α 0 −
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2π
3

)

(3.3)

where

d1=td1/Ts

and

d c = 1 − ( d 1 + d 2 ) = t c / Ts

d2=td2/Ts

are

the

two

discharging

duty

cycle

and

is the charging duty cycle, m is the modulation index and α0 is the

phase shift with respect to the line-line reference voltage, vab.
B. State-Space Averaged Modelling of CSBI
The state-space model, considered in this study, is defined as
x ( t ) = Ax ( t ) + Bu ( t )
y ( t ) = Cx ( t )

(3.4)

where, x, u and y are the states, control inputs, and outputs of the system, while A, B and
C represent the system matrix, control matrix and output matrix, respectively. The largesignal state-space-averaged model of the grid-connected single-stage boost inverter
system can be represented in the synchronous dq-frame of reference, as shown in (3.5).


idc  
d  
vq =
dt   
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− 3msin ϕ 

−Rdc

− 3mcos ϕ
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2C
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0 0

L
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f
 vdc 
  
 

 vq  + 0 0 0 vqs 
 vd   0 0 0 vds 










(3.5)

The state vector x consists of the state variables of the system, which are the independent
inductor current and capacitor voltages, i.e. x = [idc, vq, vd]T. Also, u = [vdc, vqs, vds]T
represents the system inputs. The modulation angle φ is constant, but modulation index m
regulates the injected active powers to the grid.
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3.1.2

Practical Control with Time Delay and Solution

A time delay can be estimated around a sampling period in most DSP-based controllers,
however, a DSP board can introduce a greater time delay, and it depends on the
complexity of application, parallel processors, and threats. Here, in the experimental result
and setup, a dSPACE multi DSP board DS1104 was used. This board can be directly
programmed by MathWorks joint with Real-Time Interface (RTI) developed by dSPACE
using MATLAB/SIMULINK and is connected to a desktop computer. The board has two
processors: The first one is a master DSP that operates at 250MHz, and second one is a
TMS320F240 microcontroller that operates at 20MHz as a slave DSP. The master DSP
generates and debugs the control algorithm and also monitors the data. The slave DSP acts
as a modulator for the master DSP [53].
In practical use, a time delay exists in the controlling signal and the sensing signal. For
grid-connected applications, the SE-inverters should be synchronized with grid signals.
Two voltage sensors perform this task. The data from these two sensors proceeds to the
Analog to Digital (A/D) Inputs/Outputs (I/O) of dSPACE, and then triggers the SVWPM
algorithm to generate the switching signal. On the other hand, switching signals should be
sent to the SE-CS inverter using dSPACE D/A I/O and should be modulated by the slave
DSP. Both sensing and generating switching signals processes introduce time delays in the
system. Estimating and finding solutions for these delays improves system performance
and avoids unwanted failures. For now, let an assumption include switching the signal
time delay. The time delay acquainted with the dSPACE controller can be calculated by
[53]:
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τ = Texc + 0.5Ts

(3.6)

where τ is the time delay, Texc is the execution time of the master DSP and Ts is the
sampling time.
In (3.6), if Texc is greater than 0.5Ts, the resulting time delay is longer than one sampling
cycle. In this case, if the time delays existing in the control input (switching signals) and
feedback section (grid voltage) of the system is ignored, then the dynamic performance of
the system can be corrupted and even worse, become unstable and fail. Here, the focus is
on the time delay existing in the sensing line.
To overcome this problem, a step function is sent to one of the dSPACE D/A I/O’s and
obtains its feedback from the A/D I/O’s. As soon as the step function is detected, the clock
stops and the results are divided by two. This provides a real-time track of the time delay
for both sensing signals. If this time delay is larger than the sampling time, it should be
estimated. A buffer will be used to store all data received from the grid sensors for each
sampling period. As the states are periodic, one can easily predict and estimate the current
phase of the grid for all three phases and send appropriate switching patterns to the
system. For a time delay on the control input, a modified controller can be used, as
follows.
Consider the state-space model for a SVPWM switching control (3.4). Following is the
discretized state space model of the system without a time delay:
x ( k + 1) = Gx ( k ) + H u ( k )
y ( k ) = Cx ( k )
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(3.7)

Ts
Aλ
where, H = B  e d λ and G = e ATs . The control input signal is designed based on the
0

state feedback algorithm [55]:
u (k ) = K I xI (k ) − K P x(k )

(3.8)

where KI and KP are the integration and proportional gains that can be determined by the
pole-placement method. Also, the new state variable xI can be calculated from:
x I ( k ) = x I ( k − 1) + y r ( k ) − y ( k )

(3.9)

where y r is the reference input. With the above definitions, the following are the new
state space model results:


ˆ ( k ) + Dy ( k + 1)
X ( k + 1) = AX ( k ) + Bu
r
ˆ
y ( k ) = CX ( k )

Where X ( k ) = [ x ( k )

T

x I ( k )]

, Aˆ = 

T
G
0 ˆ
, C = C 0 Bˆ = [ H −CH ]

−CG I 

[

]

(3.10)

and

T
Dˆ = [ 0 I ]

.

If there is a time delay in the control section, the Equations (3.7) will be converted to:
x ( t ) = Ax ( t ) + Bu ( t − τ )
y (t ) = C x (t )

(3.11)

In order to solve the time-delay effect in the switching control signal (3.11), an observer
controller was used based on modification of the smith predictor [52, 55]. The control
input signal under the time-delay effect can be found by substituting states x by its
predicted x̂ in (3.8):
u ( k ) = K I x I ( k ) − K P xˆ ( k )

and y by Cxˆ in (3.9):
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(3.12)

x I ( k ) = x I ( k − 1) + y r ( k ) − Cxˆ ( k )

(3.13)

where x̂ is the estimated state vector calculated by the observer that predicts the state
vector x one τ ahead of time. In the case where τ is larger than sampling period Ts, the
state estimate can be calculated as follows.

xˆ ( k ) = G x ( k ) + Hˆ 1 u ( k − 2 ) + Hˆ 2 u ( k − 1)

where Gˆ

=e

Aτ

,

T

AT s Aλ
Hˆ 1 = Be 1  e d λ
0

,

τ −Ts

Hˆ 2 = B



e

Aλ

(3.14)

dλ .

0

3.1.3 Simulation and Experimental Results

The simulation and experimental results are presented in this section to show the
effectiveness of the proposed controller based on the time delay. Figure 3.5 shows the
layout of the experimental setup. The circuit parameters in this simulation were selected
as: Vdc=30 volt, Cs=15 µF, Ldc=12 mH, Lf=2mH. The control section is implemented using
MATLAB Simulink, in conjunction with the dSPACE 1104 control block, which is
interfaced with the hardware. The PWM switching frequency is set to be 3 kHz, and the
line-to-line rms voltage value is 207.846 volt.
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Figure 3.5: Layout of Experimental Setup

Figure 3.6 illustrates the experimental results of inverter current and output voltage when
the conventional control algorithm is applied (without consideration of time delay). Since
the waveforms of all the three phases are similar, only the current and the voltage of phase
A are shown. It can be seen that the inverter current fluctuates effectively due to the time
delay of the controller, which it is not taken into account. On the other hand, as shown in
Figure 3.7, using the proposed control method, the fluctuation in the inverter current and
output voltage is properly eradicated and the CSI operates properly. To evaluate the
dynamics of the CSI, simulation is carried out to investigate the response of the active
power of the converter output to a step change of reference power.
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Figure 3.6: CSBI Performance with Conventional Control Method

Figure 3.7: CSBI Performance with Proposed Control Method

Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) show the simulation of the converter current when the active
power, Pref, has instantly changed at t=5sec from 100 to 200 watts and 100 to 50,
respectively. As shown, the controllers can effectively track the change of the active
power references without harming the stability of the system.
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Figure 3.8: Simulation Results of CSBI Response to Step Change of Active Power

3.2

Optimal Control Problem with Time-Delay

The goal of the optimal control theory is to determine control laws for a given dynamic
system subjected to optimizing one or more predefined criteria. Time delays in biology,
chemistry, electronics and mechanics domains [56-60] add one level of difficulty in the
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design phase of the control system the process. A valuable amount of studies in the
control theory have been dedicated to the optimal control theory of time-delay systems.
Different approaches have been proposed, each with its own pros and cons from the
accuracy and computational complexity point of view in theory and practical
implementation [61-65]. The conventional techniques for solving optimal control
problems can be categorized into two broad classes: (1) direct methods where the
problem is being transferred into a nonlinear programming space by parameterization and
discretization operators [60, 66], and (2) indirect methods that find the solution by
applying a dynamic programming on Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation [61] or
applying Pontryagin's maximum principle in a two-point boundary-value problem
(TPBVP) [62].
Since solving a nonlinear HJB partial differential equation is complex in most cases,
many researchers avoid using it. An excellent literature review on HJB is provided in
[63]. On the other hand, one of the most accurate methods for solving optimal control
problems is to set a series of optimal first-order necessary conditions based on
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. This method yields more accurate solutions and
provides more confidence with the obtained responses than the others. However, the
Pontryagin’s conditions that produce a system of nonlinear boundary-value differential
equations are difficult to solve.

As mentioned above, the TPBVP resulting from

Pontryagin’s maximum principle does not have an analytical solution, hence, researchers
are trying to find an approximate solution for these problems and have introduced the
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Sensitivity Approximation Approach [64], and the Successive Approximation Approach
(SAA) [65].
Here, the Homotopy Perturbation Method (HPM) is proposed and applied to solve the
two-point boundary-value problem (TPBVP). The idea of HPM is to introduce a
Homotopy parameter that takes its values from range [0 1]. The solution of each stage of
deformation is close to that one of the previous stage. In brief, the system has the original
form of equation at p = 1 , and by progressively decreasing the value of p to 0 at the final
stage of deformations, the favorable solution is found. HPM provides an accurate solution
in a few numbers of perturbations and therefore speeds up the convergence. The proposed
approach considers a quadratic cost function as the criterion and transforms the timedelay optimal control problem into a time-delay and time-advance in the shape of a TwoPoint Boundary-Value Problem (TPBVP), and then finally converts it to a set of linear
time invariant TPBVP by applying the Homotopy Perturbation Method. Unlike
traditional approaches [61-65], the presented technique only requires solving a sequence
of linear TPBVPs that effectively reduce the required amount of computations and makes
it more practical when comparing it with the approximation approaches applied in
conventional platforms.
Section 3.2.1 introduces the nonlinearity and time delay in the optimal control theory, and
Section 3.2.2 discusses the main idea of the Homotopy Perturbation Method (HPM). A
new algorithm to find a suboptimal solution based on the HPM is presented in Section
3.2.3. Results are described in Section 3.2.4, followed by the conclusion.
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3.2.1

Problem Statement

Consider a linear system with a time delay in state, as described below:
 x (t ) = Ax (t ) + Bu (t ) + B1 x (t − t d )

 x (t ) = φ (t ) , − t d ≤ t ≤ 0
 x (0) = X
0


,

0 ≤ t ≤ tf

(3.15)

with its quadratic performance index
J=

where

1 T
1
x (t f )Q f x(t f ) +
2
2

x ∈ R n and u ∈ R m are

 (x
tt

T

0

(t )Qx(t ) + u T (t ) Ru (t )

)

(3.16)

the state and the control functions, respectively. Matrices A, B

and B1 are constant with appropriate dimensions. Also let φ (t ) be a given initial vector
function,

X 0 be

an initial value, t d be a time delay and a positive integer,

positive semi-definite matrix and

R ∈ R m×m

Q ∈ R n× n

is a

is a positive definite matrix. The optimal

control problem is to find the optimal control

u ∗ (t ) ,

which minimizes the performance

index (3.16) and is subject to the system dynamic described in (3.15).
In accordance with the Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the optimal condition is
obtained as the following nonlinear TPBVP containing time-delay and time-advance
terms:
 x (t ) = Ax(t ) + B1 x(t − t d ) − BR −1 B T λ (t ) , 0 ≤ t ≤ t f

T
λ (t ) = Qx(t ) + A λ (t ) + χ (t )( B1λ (t + t d ) ) , 0 ≤ t ≤ t f

, − td ≤ t < 0
 x(t ) = φ (t )
λ (t ) = Q x(t )
f
f
 f

where
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(3-17)

1
0

χ (t ) = 

, 0 ≤ t ≤ (t f − t d )
,

(3-18)

(t f − t d ) ≤ t ≤ t f

Hence, the optimal control law can be stated as:
(3-19)

u ∗ (t ) = − R −1 B T λ (t )

Since it is quite difficult to solve such a problem approximating solutions of the twopoint boundary-valued problems (TPBVP) in (3.17) or finding a solution that will
produce, a suboptimal control will be sought. Hence, the HPM will be considered the
method to solve the TPBVP described in (3.17); details will follow.

3.2.2

Proposed Method

The model in (3.17) has both time-delay and time-advance terms. A new method based
on HPM is introduced; it will generate a linear sequence of inhomogeneous TPBVP with
no delay and advance in the state and co-state variables. To show the basic idea of this
method, let us define an operator F in (3.20a) for
(t f − t d ) ≤ t ≤ t f

0 ≤ t ≤ (t f − t d ) ,

and in (3.20b) for

:
− x (t ) + Ax (t ) + B1 x (t − t d ) − BR −1 B T λ (t ) 
F ( x(t ), λ (t )) = 
=0
T


− λ (t ) + Qx (t ) + A λ (t ) + B1λ (t + t d )
Δ

Δ − x
 (t ) + Ax(t ) + B1 x(t − t d ) − BR −1 B T λ (t ) 
F ( x(t ), λ (t )) = 
=0
T
− λ (t ) + Qx(t ) + A λ (t )


(3.20a)

(3.20b)

Now let us separate the operator F into two parts:
F ( x(t ), λ (t )) = L( x(t ), λ (t )) + N ( x(t ), λ (t ))
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(3.21)

here, L and

N

represent linear and nonlinear terms, respectively.

Based on (3.21), the Homotopy technique presented in [67] can be written as the
following:
H ( x (t , p ), λ (t , p ), P ) = QL ( x (t , p ), λ (t , p )) + PF ( x (t , p ), λ (t , p )) = 0

(3.22)

which is equivalent to:
H ( x(t , p ), λ (t , p ), P) = L ( x (t , p ), λ (t , p )) + PN ( x(t , p ), λ (t , p )) = 0
q
0

where Q = 

0
p 0 
, q = 1− p , P = 


q
0 p 

(3.23)

and p ∈ [0 1] is an embedding parameter, which is

named the Homotopy parameter. Thus, in a way that agrees with Homotopy equations in
(3.23), the perturbed vectors of x(t , p) and λ (t , p ) become as follows:
 x(t , p) : [t 0 , t f ] × [0 ,1] → R n

n
λ (t , p) : [t 0 , t f ] × [0 ,1] → R

(3.24)

Obviously from (3.24) we have:
H ( x (t , p ), λ (t , p ), 0 ) = L ( x (t , p ), λ (t , p )) = 0

H ( x(t , p), λ (t , p), I 2×2 ) = L( x(t , p), λ (t , p)) + N ( x(t , p), λ (t , p))
= F ( x(t , p), λ (t , p)) = 0

(3.25a)
(3.25b)

while p varies in the span of [0, 1], the solution of linear parts of xˆ (t ) and λˆ (t ) , as in
(3.25a), moves to the exact answers of x (t ) and λ (t ) as in (3.25b). In topology, it is called
“deformation.” A detailed illustration on choosing linear operators is displayed in [68].
In regard to the problem, two operators are selected, as follows:
(1) Linear operator:
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 ∂x(t , p)

−1 T
 ∂t − Ax(t , p) + BR B λ (t , p)
L=

 ∂λ (t , p) + Qx(t , p) + AT λ (t , p)

 ∂t


(3.26)

 B1 x(t − t d )

N =

(
)(
(
+
)
)
χ
t
B
λ
t
t
1
d



(3.27)

(2) Nonlinear operator:

Here, the embedded parameter p is used as a small parameter. The solutions of (3.20a)
and (3.20b) can be expressed as a power series of p .

x (t ) + px1 (t ) + p 2 x 2 (t ) + ... =
 xˆ (t )   0
ˆ =
λ (t ) λ (t ) + pλ (t ) + p 2 λ (t ) + ... =
0
1
2


∞





λ n (t ) p n 


 x (t ) p

n

n

n =0
∞


n =0

(3.28)

Setting p = 1 in the above series yields:

x (t ) + x1 (t ) + x2 (t ) + ... =
 xˆ (t )   0

ˆ =
λ (t )  
λ0 (t ) + λ1 (t ) + λ 2 (t ) + ... =




∞

 x (t ) 
n

n =0



∞

 λ (t )

(3.29)

n

n =0

where
xn (t ) =

1 ∂ n xˆ (t )
n! ∂p n p = 0

and

λ n (t ) =

1 ∂ n xˆ (t )
n! ∂p n

.

Substituting (3.28) into (3.20a) and (3.20b), we have:
F = L( x0 (t ), λ0 (t )) + P 1 L( x1 (t ), λ1 (t )) +  + P n L( x n (t ), λ n (t ))
+ Pg (1) ( xˆ (t ), λˆ (t )) + P 2 g ( 2 ) ( xˆ (t ), λˆ (t )) +  + P n g ( n ) ( xˆ (t ), λˆ (t ))

From (3.30), we rearrange the expression based on the order of P .

37

(3.30)

 L( x 0 (t ), λ 0 (t )) = 0

P :  x 0 (t ) = φ (t )
, − td ≤ t < 0
λ (t ) = Q x (t )
f 0
f
 0 f
0

 L( x1 (t ), λ1 (t )) + g (1) ( xˆ (t ), λˆ (t )) = 0

P 1 :  x1 (0) = 0
λ (t ) = 0
 1 f


(3.31)

 L( x n (t ), λ n (t )) + g ( n ) ( xˆ (t ), λˆ (t )) = 0

P n :  x n ( 0) = 0
λ (t ) = 0
 n f

where
∞

j
 N 1 ( x j (t ) p ,
j =0
g (1) ( xˆ (t ), λˆ (t )) = 
∞
 N 2 ( x j (t ) p j ,

j =0



∞



 λ (t ) p ) p = 0 



 λ (t ) p ) p = 0

j

j

j =0



∞

j

j

j =0


∂ n −1 N 1 ( x j (t ) p j ,

1
j =0

 ( n − 1)!
∂p n −1
(n)

ˆ
g ( xˆ (t ), λ (t )) =

∞

∂ n −1 N 2 ( x j (t ) p j ,
 1
j =0

∂p n −1
 ( n − 1)!
∞





∞





p = 0


λ j (t ) p j )


p = 0

 λ (t ) p )
j

j

j =0

∞


j =0

(3.32)

Solving all of the above linear time-invariant problems in a recursive manner leads to
x n (t ) and λ n (t ) for all n ≥ 0 . However, by making (3.29), we can find xˆ n (t ) and λˆn (t )

,which are the approximation of the exact answer. Therefore, the optimal control law can
be expressed in the form below:

u ∗ (t ) = − R −1 B T

∞

 λ (t )
n

n =0

Theorem 2.1. (Sufficient condition of convergence)
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(3.32)

Suppose that X and Y are two Banach spaces; define a contractive nonlinear:
Δ
N [ xˆ (t , p ), λˆ (t , p )] 
N = 1

ˆ
 N 2 [ xˆ (t , p ), λ (t , p )]

where N is mapping

X

(3.33)

to Y that
∀ u , u~ ;

where u and u~ are members of

N ( u ) − N ( u~ ) ≤ γ u − u~

X

(3.34)

, and γ is between 0 and 1.

Based on Banach’s fixed point theorem, the contractive nonlinear (3-34) has a unique
fixed point U which
N (U ) = U

(3.35)

The following sequence can be generated based on the HPM:

U n = N 

Δ

n −1

 Uˆ

i

i =0


 , n = 1 , 2, 3 ,...


(3-36)

 x (t ) 

where U =   .
 λ (t ) 
Suppose that U 0 = u 0 ∈ Bt (u ) where Bt (u ) = {u ∗ ∈ X u ∗ − u < t ∈ [t 0 , t f ]} and then we have:
U n ∈ B t (u )

limU n = u

n →∞

Proof.

Let n = 1 in (3.36) from (3.35), so then we have:
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(3-37)
(3-38)

U 1 − u = N (U 0 ) − N ( u ) ≤ γ u 0 − u

(3-39)

For n = n − 1 , assume U n −1 − u ≤ γ n −1 u 0 − u as an induction hypothesis. Then:
U n − u = N (U n −1 ) − N (u ) ≤ γ U n −1 − u ≤ γ n u 0 − u .

(3-40)

Using (3.40), we have:
U n − u ≤ γ n u0 − u ≤ γ nt ≤ t

Equation (3.41) concludes that

U n ∈ B t (u ) ,

(3.41)

which is proved by Equation (3.37).

γ n = 0 , there is lim
Un − u = 0 ,
From (3.40), we found that U n − u ≤ γ n u 0 − u . Since lim
n→∞
n→∞

where lim
U n= u .
n→∞

3.2.3

Suboptimal Control

Since it is impossible to find the control law from an infinite series as described in (19),
finite series must be found. To keep the first few terms in (19), we have the k th -order
suboptimal control law as described by
k

u k (t ) = − R −1 B T

λ

(n)

(t ).

n =0

(3.42)

Here the value of k can be decided based on the precision required.
With the suboptimal control law described in (3.42), the quadratic performance index can
be calculated by using
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Jk =

1 T
1
x (t f )Q f x(t f ) +
2
2

 (x (t )Qx(t ) + u
tf

T

T

0

k

(t ) Ruk (t )

)

(3.43)

where x (t ) is the corresponding state trajectory obtained by applying u k (t ) to the original
nonlinear system in (3.15) with x(t0 ) = φ(t0 ) . The process stops if we meet the condition
J k − J k −1 < ε .

(3.44)

If the error bound ε > 0 is chosen small enough, then the k th -order suboptimal control
law in (3.42) will be very close to the optimal control law u * (t ) , the value of
performance index J k will be very close to its optimal value J * , and the boundary
condition will also be satisfied.
Algorithm of Finding Suboptimal Control Law
Step 1: Construct Homotopy as described in (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24), and estimate the

initial approximations.
Step 2: Substitute equation (3.28) and (3.29) into (3.23) and (3.24), and arrange them

with respect to the order of p .
Step 3: Let j = 0 .
Step 4: Make the coefficients of p j be zero and solve the resulted linear TPBVP.
Step 5: Let j = k and calculate the k th order suboptimal control law u ( k ) (t ) according

to

(3.28). Then, this control law is applied to the nonlinear system as described by
(3.16) to corresponding state trajectory x i (t ) and the cost function J k using to
(3.29).
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Step 6: If the improvement satisfies J k − J k −1 < ε , which ε is the selected threshold, a

sufficiently small positive parameter, go to Step 7.
Step 7: Increment j by 1, then go to Step 5.
Step 8: Stop.

3.2.4

Numerical Example

Nonlinear oscillators usually described by a set of nonlinear ordinary differential
equations play an important role in high technologies such as biology, mechanics, optics,
and particularly in electronic circuits. To show the high accuracy and efficiency of the
proposed method, the developed method is applied to a harmonic oscillator with retarded
damping. [69]
Consider the problem:

 x1 (t )   x 2 (t )


=
 x 2 (t ) − x1 (t ) − x 2 (t − t d ) + u (t ) 

(3.45)

with the given initial conditions
 x1 (0) = 10

 x2 (t ) = 0,

− td ≤ t ≤ 0

(3.46)

The quadratic cost function to be minimized is described by:
2

2

J = 5 x1 (2) +

1 2
u (t )dt
20



(3.47)

To show the validation of the proposed method, first, let the delay be zero, i.e., t d = 0 .
The results from the proposal method are shown in Figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. And the
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value of the cost function of this harmonic oscillator design with the collocation method
is J = 2.2637 and the value J is 2.2632 after 5 iterations with the proposed method. To
further investigate the efficiency of this method, the amount of delay t d is increased in
the state and the performance of the system is simulated. The calculated control input
u (t ) to the system with t d = 0 .1, 0 .2 , and 0.3 are given in Figures 3.12, 3.15, and 3.18,

respectively. The corresponding state trajectories, x1 (t ) and x 2 (t ) , for the different delay
values are shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14, 3.16 and 3.17, and 3.19 and 3.20. The values
of the cost function for three different values of delay are shown in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.9: Suboptimal Control Law (t d = 0.0)
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Figure 3.10: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 (t d = 0.0)
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Figure 3.11: Optimal State Trajectory x2 (t d = 0.0)
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Figure 3.12: Suboptimal Control Law (t d = 0.1)
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Figure 3.13: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 (t d = 0.1)
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Figure 3.14: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 (t d = 0.1)
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Figure 3.15: Suboptimal Control Law (t d = 0.2)
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Figure 3.16: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 (t d = 0.2)
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Figure 3.17: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 (t d = 0.2)
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Figure 3.18: Suboptimal Control Law (t d = 0.3)
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Figure 3.19: Suboptimal State Trajectory x1 (t d = 0.3)
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Figure 3.20: Suboptimal State Trajectory x2 (t d = 0.3)

Table 3.2: Cost Function Values for Different Delays of Different Iterations

Case
1
2
3
4

3.3

Iteration
Delay

t d = 0 .0
t d = 0 .1
t d = 0 .2
t d = 0 .3

1

2

3

4

5

6.7164
6.7164
6.7164
6.7164

3.7865
2.4886
1.2246
0.2878

2.3043
1.4711
0.7146
0.1213

2.2683
1.4658
0.6245
0.1212

2.2632
1.4412
0.5916
0.1211

Conclusion

In this chapter, the importance of time-delay in ICSs was shown. First, the natural timedelay effect of an SVPWM-based switching pattern for grid-connected three-phase current
source inverter was studied. An algorithm to track the time delay in real-time to overcome
the effect of time-delay produced in sensing loop was proposed. This guarantees
synchronization between grid phase and inverter output. Also, the observer state feedback
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controller was applied to overcome the effect of time-delay in the control signal. The
experimental results clearly show that the proposed approach can compensate the effect of
time delay and improve quality of output inverter signal.
Then, the effect of ignoring natural time delay in optimal control design was shown. To
optimize linear, time-delay control systems, an efficient iterative method is offered based
on the HPM to determine the optimal control law in the form of infinite series with easy
computable terms. Despite other famous methods such as the SAA and Sensitivity
Approach (SA), this method avoids the difficulty of solving a sequence of linear timevarying TPBVPs of solving directly the nonlinear TPBVP or the HJB equation. Instead it
only needs solving a sequence of linear time-invariant TPBVPs, which is more practical
than the above-mentioned approximate methods in aspect of computational complexity.
This section shows clearly that time-delay is really important in design of optimal
controller. Ignoring small value of time-delay can significantly change result of optimal
controller cost function. It was found that dealing with systems with time delays is
difficult; hence, this is the reason that most researchers ignore delays in the controller
design process.
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CHAPTER 4
TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK ON NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS
4.1

Introduction

Networked control systems are constantly being modernized by introducing new
telecommunication technologies for control and monitoring to improve efficiency,
reliability and sustainability. This modernization effort relies on computers and multipurpose networks, but causes these systems to be vulnerable to cyber attacks and greatly
impacts people’s lives and affects the economy.
Consider for instance, U.S. power networks; they operate with supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems are industrial control systems for
large scale processes that include multiple sites and operate over long distances. Despite
the precautions, several cyber attacks on SCADA systems have been reported [1, 2, 7073].

Furthermore,

replacing

proprietary

communication

networks

with

open

communication standards causes the process control and SCADA systems to become
vulnerable to cyber security risks [74].
In general, an intruder performing an attack could access the IT infrastructure of ICSs,
gain access to various sensors and control signals, and manipulate them to disrupt and
sabotage the system. For example, an intruder can increase a load on a particular power
transformer, shut down sections of a control system, or introduce inefficiencies in the
system and the plant [9, 12, 13, 75].
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Investigating the methods of attacks on ICSs of sensitive infrastructures, devising
measures, and security control protocols have attracted the attention of academia and
industries. These industries’ efforts have ended in a large amount of literature and in the
production of hardware and software systems dedicated to security measures that prevent
possible attacks on industrial systems. An attack called the “time-delay-switch attack” or
“TDS” for short in the NCS introduced in this section. This attack can be aimed at
different parts of NCS and cause inefficiency or stability issues in the system.
In this chapter, TDS attacks are introduced and how this type of attack can be injected into
a NCS by a hacker is discussed. Then, the impact of introducing time delays in the
sensing loop (SL) or in the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) signal, which is the only
automatic closed loop between the IT and the power system on a control area, is
discussed. When a hacker introduces delays in a control system, they are performing a
time-delay-switch attack (TDS). The effects of this attack on another application related to
the biomedical industry were also studied. This chapter also details how a TDS attack can
cause any control system to become unstable. Therefore, future NCSs will have to use an
advanced two-way communication and design new controllers to provide a better
situational awareness of the state of a system, keeping NCS reliable and safe from TDS
attacks.
4.2

TDS Attack Model on NCS

A time-delay switch attack can be injected into different parts of a NCS. It can be
injected into the feedback line (signal transmitted from the plant output to the controller),
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the referenced signal, and the control signal in Figure 4.1, respectfully. Here, a TDS
attack on the feedback line is addressed.

Figure 4.1: Different Places that TDS Attacks can be Injected

Consider a general LTI system, described as follows:
 x (t ) = Ax(t ) + Bu (t )

 x(0) = x0
 y (t ) = Cx(t ) + Du (t )


(4.1)

where x and y are state and output vectors, u is the control signal and x0 is the initial
state value. Also A , B , C and D are constant matrices with appropriate dimensions.
The controller is described as:
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U = h(y)

(4.2)

where y is the information communicated to the controller about the plant’s state. The
function,

h

, describes the plant’s output and communication methodology.

An attack on the control system involves altering any component of the NCS. A general
attack can be described as a function that alters any of the components of the system:
~ ~ ~ ~
~
( A, B , C , D , ~
x, ~
y , u~, t ) = Λ ( A, B, C , D , x, y , u , t )

(4.3)

~ ~ ~ ~

where ( A, B , C , D, ~x , ~y , u~, ~t ) are the corrupted functions as a result of the attack Λ. The
TDS attack can be modeled as follows:
otherwise
~y =  y

attack
 y (t − τ )

(4.4)

or
~  t
t =
t − τ

otherwise
attack

(4.5)

where τ is function of t and is a random variable time-delay that is always less than
time t .
4.3

TDS Attacks in Communication Systems

An illustration of a TDS attack on a NCS through a simplified version of Figure 4.1 is
shown in Figure 4.2. The plant is a power-area system controlled by the load frequency
controller. The x(t) is a vector of the state of power area, and is measured and transmitted
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to the controller via communication lines. The u (t) is the control signals, r(t) is the
desired state, and e(t) is the difference between the desired state and the measured plant
state. The intruder attacks the communication line between the plant and controller either
by dropping the packets or delaying them. The plant (P) sends the state variables, x(t), as
information packets to the TDS attack variants.
Reference
Signal

r (t )

u(t )
+

Error

e (t )

Controller

Receiver

Control Signal

Plant

Network
(Wired/ Wireless)

x (t )
Output Signal

Sender

Attacker

Figure 4.2: A Simplified NCS System under a TDS Attack

Replay TDS Attack. The attacker leaves the first message x(0.1) intact. Then, it records

and drops the second message, x(0.2), and resends in its place the first message.
Subsequently, it sends x(0.2) instead of the third message, etc. The attacker can
generalize this attack by introducing different time delays. Table 4.1 illustrates the steps
of this attack where the attacker adds a delay of 0.1 sec. In the table, “TS” denotes the
timestamp.
Table 4.1: Scenario 1, Sequence of Events During a Replay TDS Attack

TS
0.1
0.2
0.3

{TS, P(t)}

{TS, C(t)}

{0.1, x(0.1)}

{0.1, x(0.1)}

{0.2, x(0.2)}

{0.1, x(0.1)}

{0.3, x(0.3)}

{0.2, x(0.2)}
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Controller Input (e(t))
r (0.1) − x (0.1) or 0
r (0.2) − x (0.2 − 0.1) or 0
r (0.3) − x (0.3 − 0.1) or 0

Timestamp-based TDS Attack. The attacker reconstructs the packet, and fixes the

timestamp.

In this way, the timestamping detector is not able to find the time-delay

attack. The attacker receives the first message from the plant, and copies the value in the
buffer. Then, it substitutes the state value of the first packet inside the second message,
and reconstructs the packet. Then, it sends the packet to the controller. Table 4.2
illustrates this scenario. In this table, x1 denotes the first state value, x2 the second state
value, and so forth. Let us say that the plant sends x2 at 0.2 sec, and attacker copies it.
Now, consider that the controller get x3 at 0.3 sec. At this time, the attacker sends x2
instead of x3 with a corrected 0.3 time stamp. This can happen even on encrypted
scenarios if the attacker can decrypt the packet and reconstruct it with the new wrong
state, and correct the time stamps.
Table 4.2: Scenario 2, Sequence of Events During Timestamps Alter TDS Attack

TS
0.1
0.2

{TS, P(t)}

{TS, C(t)}

Controller Input

{0.1, x1 (0.1)}

{0.1, x1 (0.1)}

r1 (0.1) − x1 (0.1)

{0.2, x 2 (0.2)}

{0.2, x1 (0.2)}

r2 (0.2) − x1 (0.2)

= r2 (0.2) − x2 (0.2 − 0.1)

0.3

{0 .3, x 3 ( 0 .3)}

{0.3, x 2 (0.3)}

r3 (0.3) − x2 (0.3)

= r3 (0.3) − x3 (0.3 − 0.1)

Noise-based TDS Attack. The attacker injects fake packages into the system, making the

system add the delay to the transmission of system packages. In this way, the packets
from the plant are delivered to the controller with the delay.
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4.4

Sabotage and Destabilizing Analysis of TDS Attack

4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis

Before commencing the proof of the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks, the
assumptions and definitions are examined.

An assumption of approximation is made of the NCS by a linear time-invariant (LTI)
system. Also, an assumption is made that the controller is the optimal controller with
optimal gain K. This can be easily extended for other types of controllers. This
dissertation focuses on the optimal controller in most of the applications, as these types of
controllers are more sensitive to TDS attacks.
Let

h

be defined by the following (also shown in Figure 4.3):
0 t ≤ t a
h=
1 t > t a

(4.6)

Then, the NCS controller under a TDS attack can be written as:
u = − K~
y = − K [(1 − h ) x + hx d ]

where

x d = x (t − t d )

,

ta

is the start time of the attack.

57

(4.7)

Figure 4.3: Step Function, h(t)

It is obvious that the system is stable for all ≤
However, for >

by definition of the optimal controller.

it is not obvious whether or not the system would be stable.

Theorem: The system described in (4.1) under attack (4.7) is not efficient for any delay
t d > 0 , and can be unstable for large values of delay.

Theorem 4-1:

Applying (4.7) to (4.1) results in:
X = AX − BK ((1 − h ) X + h X d )

(4.8)

X = ( A − BK ) X + hBK ( X − X d )

(4.9)

Let us write (4.8) as:

Δ

Define G =( A − BK ) . G is a negative definite, since the system is stable without the attack.
Then, Equation (4.9) is written as:
X = (G + hBK ) X − hBKX d

Now, let us integrate Equation (4.10):
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(4.10)

t

X = e Gt + BK (t −t a ) h X 0 − e Gt + BK ( t − t a ) h BK  e −Gr − BK ( r −t a ) h hx d dr
0

(4.11)

Suppose t > t a and t > t d , such that t − t a ≈ t and h = 1 . Then, Equation (4.11) can be
approximated by:
t
X ≈ e At X 0 − BK   e A ( t − r ) X d dr 
 t a


(4.12)

Since A is a negative definite, then for large t:
t
X ≈ − BK   e A ( t − r ) X d dr 
 t a


(4.13)

Equation (4.13) represents the asymptotic behavior of the system after the attack. The
Differentiate Equation (4.13) with all constant terms multiplied by e At :
X ≈ − BKX (t − t d )

(4.14)

If Equation (4.14) is shifted by td, the result is
X (t + t d ) ≈ − BKX (t )

(4.15)

X (t + t d ) − X ( t ) ≈ − BK [ X ( t ) − X ( t − t d )]

(4.16)

X ( t ) − X ( t − t d ) ≈ − BK [ X ( t − t d ) − X ( t − 2 t d )]

(4.17)

then:

and

therefore,
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t
X (t + t d ) − X (t ) ≈ ( BK ) 2  X ( s − t d ) − X ( s − 2t d )ds
0

(4.18)

Equation (4.18) means that as time progresses in increments of td, the derivative of
difference X (t + t d ) − X (t ) is growing exponentially in multiples of BK for eig ( BK ) > 1

. Hence, the system is unstable.
Proof 4-2: Consider a scenario where a hacker injects a TDS attack for a period of time.

In order to show that TDS attacks can destabilize the systems, the following proof is used
for the hybrid system. Before commencing the proof, an assumption is made that the
system can be approximated by a linear time-invariant (LTI) system, and its optimal
controller has the form u (t ) = − Kx (t ).
When under a TDS attack, the control can be described as:
 − K x (t )

u (t ) =  − K x ( t − τ )
 − K x (t )


t ≤ ta
ta < t ≤ tb

(4.19)

t ≥ tb

where τ is a set of random time delays, t a is the start time of attack, and t b is the end
time of an attack. It is obvious that the system is stable for all t ≤ t a and maybe stable for
t ≥ tb

by the definition of the optimal controller. However, for t a < t ≤ tb it is not obvious

that the system would be stable.
Theorem 4-2: Without loss of generality, we suppose t b = ∞ . Then we consider the

system described in (4.1) with an attack described by (4.19). The system under attack is
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not stable if the hybrid dynamic model of system has at least one positive eigenvalue or at
least one pole in the Right Half Plane (RHP).
Proof:

By applying (4.19) to (4.1) for t < t a , we obtain:
x (t ) = Ax(t ) − BKx(t )

(4.20)

where its characteristic equation is:
sI − ( A − BK ) = 0

(4.21)

Solving (4.21) for “ s ” provides the eigenvalues of the system before an attack.
For t > t a , the system is described by:
X (t) = AX(t ) − BK X (t −τ )

(4.22)

Taking the Laplace transform from the above equation, we obtain
sX ( s ) = AX ( s ) − BKe − sτ X ( s )

(4.23)

Let X (t ) = e st be a proposed solution of (4.22), followed by
se st I = Ae st − BKe − sτ e st .

Here, “ s ” must satisfy the characteristic equation of the delay system (4.22), i.e.
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(4.24)

(4.25)

sI − ( A − BKe− sτ ) = 0 .

In order to keep the system in the same stable situation as before the attack, the new
eigenvalues should be at the same place as the eigenvalues right before the attack. So
from (4.21) and (4.25), we obtain
(4.26)

BK (− I + e − sτ I ) = 0  e − sτ I = I .

Equation (4.26) is satisfied if and only if τ

= 0.

Then, we can conclude for τ

> 0,

and the

system (4.9) will be disturbed for those subspaces (time delays), where for larger time
delays, the system will be unstable.

4.4.2

TDS Attack on Load Frequency Control in Smart Grid

In this section, the focus is on the impact of introducing time delays in the SL or in the
AGC signal--the only automatic closed loop between the IT and the power system on a
control area. When a hacker chooses to introduce delays in a control system, they are
performing a Time-Delay-Switch attack (TDS). The research in this dissertation will
show how TDS attacks can make any control system, in particular, a power control
system, unstable. Therefore, future smart grids will use advanced two-way
communication and artificial intelligence technologies to provide better situational
awareness of power grid states, keeping smart grids reliable and safe from FDI, DOS or
TDS attacks. While these technologies will facilitate the aggregation and communication
of both system-wide information and local measurement, they will also have their own
cyber security challenges.
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It is reasonable to model a power system under a TDS attack as a hybrid system, by
formulating TDS attacks as a switch action “Off/Delay-by-td,” where td is a random delay
time, of sensed system states or control signals of a power system. A TDS attack on the
power Load Frequency Control (LFC) system is used as an example. Consider a two-area
power system with an automatic gain control under attack in Figure 4.4 [13]. The LFC
sends a control signal and is updated through communication channels from/to the
turbine and from the telemeter’s measurements for RTUs. The communication channels
are either wireless networks or wired.

Figure 4.4: Two-area Power System with LFC under a TDS Attack

Attacks can be launched by jamming the communication channels (i.e., DOS attack), by
distorting feedback signals (e.g., FDI attack), or by injecting delays (i.e., TDS attack) into
the data from telemeter measurements. LFC controllers are usually designed as an
optimal feedback controller. However, for the LFC controller to operate optimally, it
requires real-time power states to be telemetered with negligible delays to the controllers.
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Hence, sensors, communication protocols, and channels must be reliable and fast enough
to guarantee optimal operation. Now, if a hacker introduces delays in the telemetered
control signals or the measured states, then the LFC system will deviate from optimality,
and in most cases, break down.
Model of Load Frequency Control under TDS Attack

Consider a two-area power plant with the automatic gain control under attack in Figure
4.4. The load frequency controller sends control signals to the plant and gets state
feedback through the communication channels from the turbines and measurements for
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The communication channels are wireless networks.
Attacks can be launched by jamming the communication channels (i.e., DOS attack [12]),
by distorting feedback signals (e.g., FDI attack [76]), or by injecting delays (i.e., TDS
attack [77]) into data coming from telemeter measurements.
The LFC is usually designed as an optimal feedback controller, but in order for it to
operate optimally, it requires power state estimation to be telemetered in real time. If a
hacker introduces significant time delays in the telemetered control signals or measured
states, the LFC will deviate from its optimality, and in most cases, the system will break
down. A LFC power system was modeled as being under a TDS attack as a hybrid
system in a switch action “Off/Delay-by-τ,” where τ is some delay time of the sensed
system state or the control signals.
A portion of the LFC multi-area interlock power system is shown, as described in [78].
More details can be found in [13]. The LFC dynamic model for the ith area is given by
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 x i (t ) = Aii x i ( t ) + Bi u i (t ) + h( x j (t ), ΔPli )
 i
 x (0) = x0i

(4.27)

where x ∈ R5 and u ∈ R5 are the state and the control vectors, respectively. The model of
the ith area is influenced by the j th power area. Matrices Aii and Bi are constant matrices
with suitable dimensions, and ΔPli is the power deviation of the load. The initial state
vector is denoted by x0i for the ith power area. Then the state vector is defined as
x i (t ) = [Δf i (t ) ΔPgi (t ) ΔPtui (t ) ΔPpfi (t ) Λi (t )]T

where

i
Δf i , ΔPgi , ΔPtu , Δ Ppfi

and

Λi

(4.28)

are frequency deviation, power deviation of the

generator, position value of the turbine, tie-line power flow and control error on the ith
power area, respectively [19]. The control error of the ith power area is expressed as
t



Λi (t ) = β i Δf i (s)ds

(4.29)

0

where βi denotes the frequency bias factor.
In the dynamic model of the LFC, Aii , Bi , and
μi

 −J
i

 0


1
Aii =  −
ω
T

i g i
N
 2πTij
i ≠ j
 j =1
 β i



1
Ji
1
−
Ttu i
0

h ( x j ( t ), ΔPli ) are

0
1
Ttu i
1
−
Tg i

−

1
Ji
0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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0

0


0


0


1

represented as

(4.30)


1
Bi = 0 0
T
gi


h ( x j ( t ), ΔPli ) =


0 0


T

(4-31)

N

 Aij x j (t ) + Di ΔPli

i≠ j
j =1

(4-32)

where N is the total number of power areas, J i , ωi , μi , Tg i and Ttu i are the generator
moment of inertia, the speed-droop coefficient, generator damping coefficient, the
governor time constant, the turbine time constant in the ith power area and Tij is the
stiffness constant between the ith and the j th power areas, respectively. Also we have
 0
 0

Aij =  0

− 2πTij
 0

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

(4.33)

and,
 1
Di =  −
 Ji


0 0 0 0


T

(4.34)

Equation (4.35) gives the extension of the dynamic model (4.27) to the multi-area power
system with the attack model using Equations (4.30), (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.34).
 X (t ) = AX ( t ) + BU ( t ) + DΔPl

 X (0) = X 0

where

66

(4.35)

X (t ) = [x 1 (t ) x 2 (t )  x N (t ) ]

T

 A11
A
 21
A =  A31

 
 AN 1


A12

A13

A22

A23

A 32


A33


AN 2

AN 3

(4.36)

A1 N 
 A2 N 
 A3 N 


 
 ANN 


(4.37a)

B = diag{[B1T

B2T

B3T

 BNT ] }

(4.37b)

D = diag{[D1T

D2T

D3T

 DNT ] }

(4.37c)

T

T

where B and D are 5N×5N matrices.
The optimal feedback controller is given by
(4.38)

U = −KX

where optimal gain K is a 5N×N matrix, the control signal and state signal are 5N×5N
matrixes.
The design of the optimal controller for the LFC system in the normal operation (i.e.,
with no attack) involves minimizing a cost function described as
t

f

1
J=
{ X T (t )QX (t ) + U T (t ) RU (t )}dt
2 0



where the matrix Q ∈ ℜ5 N ×5 N is positive semi-definite and

(4.39)

R ∈ ℜ 5 N ×5 N

is a positive definite.

Then, the optimal control problem is to obtain an optimal control signal U (t ) that
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minimizes the performance index (4.39), which is subject to the dynamic of the system
with no time-delay in its states.
The system with the optimal controller is described by the following equation:
 X (t ) = ( A − BK ) X (t ) + DΔPl

 X (0) = X 0

(4.40)

With the time-delay attack, the control signal will be modified by:
U = −KXˆ

(4.41)

and the new state after the attack can be modeled by:
 xˆ1   x1 (t − t d 1 ) 
ˆ  

 x2  =  x2 (t − t d 2 ) 
 


  

 xˆ N   x N (t − t dN )

(4.42)

In (4.42), td1, td 2 ,... and tdN can be different/random time delays and are positive values.
When td1, td 2 , ...,tdN are all zero, the system is in normal operation. A hacker can gain
access to the communication link and inject a delay attack on the line to direct the system
to abnormal operations.
Remark 1: In this paper, ΔPl is considered constant. This is a reasonable case, because
the stability of the power system will not be influenced by an appropriate period
following a step load change [13].
This section analyzes TDS attack effects; in the upcoming chapters, the robust controller
is proposed in the face of this attack. At this point, an optimal controller in normal
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operation (with no attack) is designed, and then the system is attacked with an on/off
switch SW and the behavior of the system experiencing a TDS attack is analyzed.
The optimal control problem is to obtain optimal control U

*

(t ) ,

which minimizes the

performance index (4.39), and is subject to the dynamic system described in (4.35) with
no time-delay in state.
Simulation studies were conducted to evaluate the effects of TDS attacks on the
dynamics of the system. The optimal control law can be found for the system in its
normal operation. For simplicity of discussion, N = 2 is set, which is defined as a two-area
power system.

Table 4.3 shows the parameter values used in this process. Since

simulation on a certain duration tracks a step load change, we also set ΔPl1 and

Δ Pl 2 = 0 .

Then, the instability of the system can be studied by finding the eigenvalues of the system
before and after the attack. Roots (zeros) of (4.42) determine the stability of the system.
For simulation simplicity, the fifth order Pade approximation [79] was used to
approximate e − sτ .
Table 4.3: Parameter Values for Two-Area Power System

Parameter

Value

J1

μ1

Parameter

Value

10

ω1

0.05
0.12 s

1.5

Tg 1

Ttu 1

0.2 s

Ttu 2

0.45 s

T12

0.198 pu / rad

0.198 pu/ rad

T21

J2

12

ω2

0.05

μ2

1

Tg 2

0.18s

R

100 I

Qf

0

Q

100 I

tf

β1

β2

∞

21.5
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21

sI − ( A − BK

30240 − 15120sτ + 3360s 2τ 2 − 420s 3τ 3 + 30s 4τ 4 − s 5τ 5
)=0
30240 + 15120sτ + 3360s 2τ 2 + 420s 3τ 3 + 30s 4τ 4 + s 5τ 5

(4.45)

Figure 4.5 shows the results of the system’s eigenvalues before and after different TDS
attacks. As τ tends to be larger than zero, the eigenvalues move from the LHP to the
RHP. It clearly shows that the system becomes unstable for time delays larger than
τ = 0 .3 sec . In Figure 4.5, the crosses, points, circles and stars denote the eigenvalues of

the system with no attack and attacks with the time delays τ
τ = 0 . 6 sec

= 0 . 1 sec

,

τ = 0 . 4 sec

and

, respectfully. Figure 4.6 shows the maximum eigenvalue track based on

different time-delay values. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 clearly show that the system becomes
unstable when the delay value increases.
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Figure 4.5: Eigenvalues of the System for Normal Operation and Attack by Different Time Delays
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Figure 4.6: Maximum Eigenvalues for Different Time-delay Attacks

The total simulation time is 40 sec, and the hacker has access to switch

SW

in Figure 4.4

and starts the TDS attack with τ = [t d1 t d 2  t dn ]T . In Figure 4.7, the graphs (a), (b), (c)
and (d) show the simulation results of the frequency deviation, the power deviation of the
generator, the value position of the turbine and the tie-line power flow, respectively.
Case 1:

The hacker attacks all of the states at t a = 15 s , with the same time-delay pattern. In
Figure 4.7 (a), (b), (c) and (d), the black lines show normal operation. TDS attacks 1 and
2 denote time-delay attacks with td1=0.4, td2=0.4,…, td2=0.4 seconds and with td1=0.6,
td2=0.6, …, td2=0.6 seconds, respectively. It is clear that the system moves into an
unstable region as it is attacked.
Case 2:

The attack starts at time t a = 5 s , and the hacker attacks only one state of the system. In
Figure 4.8, in graphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), TDS attacks 1 and 2 denote attacks with a time
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delay of t d 1 = 0.6 and t d 1 = 1 , respectively (this means that there is no time-delay attack for
other states). In the case of a TDS attack at t d 1 = 0.3 , the system is disturbed but is still
stable.
The results of Case 1 and Case 2 conclude that the hacker can cause system instability
just by attacking one state of the system.
This section considers TDS attacks, a new type of attack on the cyber layer of smart grids
that can sabotage the dynamic performance of power systems. The LFC power system
experiencing a TDS attack is modeled as hybrid systems, and the TDS attacks are
formulated as switch action “Off/Delay-by-τ” sensing channels or control inputs. Then,
the destabilizing action of TDS attacks on power systems was studied using methods
from hybrid system theories. A two-area LFC LTI model was simulated to evaluate the
effects of TDS attacks. The results show that TDS attacks affect the dynamic
performance of the LFC system, and in many cases, could destroy the system’s stability,
which can be launched at any time during the operation of the power system. In the
following chapters, the focus is on attempts to make controllers and communication
protocols robust under this type of attack.
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Figure 4.7: Case 1, (a) Frequency Deviation, Δ f
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4.4.3. TDS Attack on Peace Maker, an Application in Biomedical Systems

There are many analyses and design techniques developed for LTI systems [80, 81].
However, for a nonlinear system that could possibly be time-varying, one needs a
nonlinear control methodology. A major part of a nonlinear control theory studies how to
extend the well-known linear methods to nonlinear systems.
One of the most complex but robust nonlinear systems is the human heart. An
electrocardiogram (ECG) records potential differences between two electrodes located on
the skin at predetermined positions on the chest to measure the electrical activities in
cardiac tissue. A solitary cycle of an ECG consists of the activities of relaxation and
contraction of the heart (called “heart pumping actions”). One can identify an ECG signal
by its P, Q, R, S, and T peaks, PR and ST segments, PR and QT intervals, and QRX
complex. Characteristic information obtained from an ECG can be used to assess cardiac
health and identify potential heart problems. For example, important information
extracted from an ECG recording is the time between successive R-peaks, which is an
RR-interval. The changeability of the series of RR-intervals, known as heart rate
variability (HRV), is being used to measure heart functions, such as: identifying a
patient’s risk for cardiovascular failure [82], as “an indicator for mortality following
myocardial infarction” [83], and as a measure of the contacts between different control
mechanisms of physiology, like respiratory sinus arrhythmia.
The development of mathematical models of the heartbeat (ECG) with appropriate
PQRST peaks, QRX complex, (PR, ST) segments, (PR, QT) intervals and HRV spectra
has been and continues to be the subject of wide investigations with varying degrees of
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successes. A successful ECG model becomes a valuable tool for analyzing the various
effects of physiological conditions of the outlines of the ECG and for the assessment of
diagnostic ECG signal processing devices.
The type of ECG signal is the result of the propagation of electrical activities in the
myocardium, and the HRV is the result of physiological and neurological controls. In
1972, Zeeman presented a set of nonlinear dynamical equations for heartbeat modeling
[84, 85] based on the Van der Pol-Lienard equation. These models are based on
pacemaking generated by the Sino-Atrial (SA) node, which is the dominant pacemaker,
compared with the slower one produced by the Atrio-Ventricular (AV) junction.
Furthermore, these models did not take into consideration the sympathetic and
parasympathetic modulations responsible for HRV generation [86].
In [87], the Zeeman’s 2nd-order ordinary differential equation (ODE) of the heartbeat
model was modified by incorporating a switch (on/off) control variable demonstrating the
pacemaker’s mechanism of the contraction-relaxation for the heart. Subsequently,
Jafarnia-Dabanloo et al. in 2007 [88] modified the 3rd-order nonlinear Zeeman model by
adding control parameters that affect the frequency of the oscillation to control the HRV
by using a neural network to produce the ECG signal.
Yet another well-known approach to model the cardiac rhythms is based on the Van der
Pol oscillators. In contrast to the Zeeman models, the coupled Van der Pol oscillator
models at AV node have a more active role in pace making [89]. This model allows us to
consider the effect of the coupling between the SA and the AV pacemakers in normal
electrophysiological dynamics.
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In this section, the stability of the heartbeat model that was developed by Zeeman [84] is
examined. This model captures, at least qualitatively, three essential characteristics of
cardiac dynamics: (i) a stable equilibrium, (ii) a threshold for triggering the action
potential, and (iii) a return to equilibrium. The model consists of a 2nd-order nonlinear
ODE of the Liénard-type representing the heartbeat dynamics [90].
In this era of pervasive communication technology, distant monitoring and follow-up of
patients implanted with pacemakers (PMs) and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators
(ICDs) is becoming very common. Most companies fit PMs and ICDs with wireless
capability that communicates information to home transmitters, then to physicians. These
systems are widely used in the U.S. and are being introduced in Europe. Only recently, a
tiny wireless pacemaker was launched in Europe by Nanostim [91]. The security of
current and future biomedical devices is going to draw a major concern of public health
in the future. Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security underscored some
threats affecting almost 300 medical devices [92, 93]. The latest technology in wireless
pacemakers [91] makes them vulnerable to hackers that can gain access to and sabotage
such medical devices. Attacks such as false data injection, denial of service and other
types of attacks can make lives that depend on wireless enabled devices such as
pacemakers difficult and dangerous. Therefore, it is reasonable to model the heartbeat
pacemaker system under time-delay-switch (TDS) attacks and provide a possible
solution. The TDS attack is a switched action “Off/Delay-by-τ,” where τ specifies
random delay times of the sensed system states or control signals of a system. The TDS
attack on the heartbeat control system is modeled (Figure 4.9) as a hybrid system. Then, a
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solution will be provided using an emotional learning control to temper the effects of
such an attack on the control of heartbeats in Chapter 8.
The first section of the paper introduces a common nonlinear model of heartbeat, i.e.,
Zeeman models. The stability of the 2nd-order heartbeat model using the indirect method
is also discussed.

Figure 4.9: Heartbeat Control Model with Possible Control Attack

Nonlinear Heart Model under TDS Attack

Based on [84], the second-order nonlinear heartbeat model is provided by:
 1

 X 1 (t )  − { X 13 (t ) − TX 1 (t ) + X 2 (t )}
,

= ε

 X 2 (t )  X 1 (t ) − x d




where the states

X 1 (t )

and

X 2 (t )

T >0

(4.43)

represent the length of a muscle fiber and a state related

to electrochemical activities, x d indicates a typical muscle fiber length, ε is a small
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positive constant that plays a role in fast eigenvalues of the system, and finally, T shows
the tension in the muscle fiber. Parameter values are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Parameters Value of Model (4.43)
Parameter

xd

T

ε

value

1.024

1

0.2

Values in Table 4.4 were checked by analyzing the equilibrium point stability using the
well-known Lyapunov indirect stability theorem [94]. For this purpose, let

A

be the

Jacobian matrix of Equation 1 at the origin.

 ∂X 1

∂X
A= 1
 ∂X
 2
 ∂X 1



 1
− (3 X 12 − T )

= ε


2
1


∂X 2 
X =0

∂X 1
∂X 2
∂X

For the parameter xd = 0 , the eigenvalues of

A

−

1
ε

0

X =0

T
= ε

 1

1
− 
ε

0 

(4.44)

have the values of 3.618 and 1.382 . Both

are positive and show that the origin is not stable.
The condition for the real part of the eigenvalue to be negative is
system can be stable if X 1 ≥

3 X 12 − T > 0 .

Hence, the

T
T
, and X 1 ≤ −
. These conditions can be satisfied if the
3
3

value of x d is 1 .024 . For x d = 1.024 , the stable equilibrium point is at (1.024, − 0.0497) in
the state space. In this case, all of the trajectories, irrespective of their primary conditions,
move toward the diastolic equilibrium point.
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The system stays at the stable equilibrium point endlessly, until the equilibrium point is
stable, except there is an exterior excitation that forces the system to move to a new
equilibrium point. Based on this new stable system, a control input is added to the system
(4.43), as shown below:
 1

 X 1 (t )  − { X 13 (t ) − TX 1 (t ) + X 2 (t )}
=
ε


 X 2 (t ) ( X 1 (t ) − x d ) + ( x d − x s )u (t ) 



(4.45)

when the heart is in systolic state, xs is an additional parameter representing a typical
fiber length, and

u ( t ) shows

the cardiac pacemaker control mechanism that leads the heart

into diastolic and systolic states. The feedback controller can be found in the form of:
u (t ) = − KXˆ

(4.46)

and the new state after the attack (or random delay of feedback line) can be modeled by:
Xˆ = X (t − τ )

(4.47)

In Equation (4.47), τ is the time delay and a positive integer. When the time delay is
zero, the system works in its normal operation. The hacker can access the communication
line and delay the communication line. This model is true also for the small value of
delay, which can occur in the nature of the wireless sensor.
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Stability Simulation and Results

The 2nd order heartbeat model to track the ECG signal using the PID controller was
simulated. Then, an external TDS attack was applied to the model from a start time tS
until a final time t F to show the performance of a classical PID controller.
Figure 4.10 shows the ECG reference tracking X 2 (t ) using the PID under a TDS attack.
The dashed line shows the PID controller tracking an ECG signal under a TDS attack,
and the solid line shows the referenced ECG signal [95].
The TDS attack or feedback delay was applied to the model from t S = 0.4 sec until
t S = 0.45 sec with

a time delay of

τ = 0 . 01 s

. For the purpose of visual comparison, the attack

period and the amount of attacks selected were a smaller amount because for a larger
period and time-delay value, the classical PI controller goes outside the visual
boundaries.
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Figure 4.10: Effect of TDS Attack on PID Controller of Heartbeat Model

Based on the above simulation, it is obvious that TDS attacks can disturb and disable any
control system.
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CHAPTER 5
TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK DETECTION
5.1

Introduction

This chapter will demonstrate how to detect a TDS attack on Networked Control
Systems, and particularly in networked power control systems. Time delays injected by a
hacker in a control system, in general, destabilizes the system or causes inefficiency. This
is a new attack in the context of control systems (e.g., load frequency control (LFC)) on
NCSs [93], which is called a “TDS attack.” To avoid the damaging effects of TDS
attacks, systems and controllers must be redesigned in such a way that it can detect and
correct variable time delays.
A varying amount of time delays exist in almost any dynamic system in the sensing and
control loops. Let us consider power systems for this section. The traditional controllers
of power systems were designed based on the availabe information ignoring the existance
of time delays. However, power grids constantly enhance new telecommunication
technologies for monitoring, and improving the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability
of supply and distribution. For example, the introduction of a Wide Area Measurement
System (WAMS) provides synchronized, near real-time measurements in Phase
Measurement Units (PMUs). WAMS, which are used for stability analysis of power
systems, can also be used for designing efficient controllers. Nevertheless, time delays
are present in PMU measurements as a result of natural transmission lines [96].
Several studies considered control systems with time delays [76, 97, 98]. The impact of
time delay on the power system’s stabilizing controllers was discussed in [99-103]. In
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[104], the authors studied the effects of delays on the small signal stability of control
systems. In [99] and [100], methods are proposed to eliminate oscillations that result
from time-delayed feedback control. In [105], the authors presented a wide-area control
system for damping generator oscillations. In [96], a controller was proposed using
phasor measurements with delays, in which the small-signal stability of the power
system was considered. A feedback controller for power systems with delayed states was
proposed in [106]. The controller deals with the combined effects of the instantaneous as
well as the delayed states using the quadratic Lyapunov function for systems with delays.
Additional studies on control systems with delay can be found in [21, 78, 97, 107, 108]
and the references therein. However, most of these

studies considered either the

construction of controllers that are robust to time delays or controllers that use offline
estimates of time delays. Furthermore, few studies [15, 109] considered the control of
systems with time delays introduced by hackers.,It is assumed that there are no control
methods that perform an online estimation of dynamic time delays and real-time control
of power systems.
In this section, a simple yet effective method to address a TDS attack on the observed
states of a controlled system is described. This method utilizes a time delay estimator, a
communication protocol to alert for a time-delay switch attack, a buffer to store the
history of controller commands, an optimal controller to stabilize or track a reference
signal, and a local to the plant emergency controller to stabilize the plant if long time
delays are detected. For now, only the LTI systems with state feedback will be examined.
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5.2

TDS Attack Detection and Real-Time Monitoring Method

The proposed method is shown in Figure 5.1. Its basic elements are a plant model, a timedelay detector, a controller, and a computer system. The controller can either be a PID
controller or an optimal feedback controller. The time-delay detector estimates the time
delay in the communication channel from telemetered data. If the delay is larger than an
acceptable time delay, it sends alarm signals to the controller and the emergency
controller. The results of TDS detectors are used to activate the emergency controller to
stabilize the system in case of an attack on the communication lines of the distant
controller. If an alarm signal is received by the emergency controller, it will begin to
stabilize the plant to a desired state, while the distant controller stops operating until the
delay is corrected.

Figure 5.1: Block Diagram of Proposed Technique

Suppose the system used is the linear time invariant (LTI) or can be approximated in a
region of interest by a LTI system, then it can be described by
x (t ) = Ax (t ) + Bu (t ) ,
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(5.1)

where x and u are state and control vectors, respectively. Matrices A and B are constant
matrices with suitable dimensions.
Then, its solution is given by:
t

x (t ) = e At x 0 +  e A ( t − s ) Bu ( s ) ds ,

(5.2)

0

With time delay τ, due to a time-delay switch attack or any natural delay, the solution
becomes:
x (t − τ ) = e

A ( t −τ )

x0 +

t −τ

e

A ( t −τ − s )

Bu ( s ) ds .

(5.3)

0

Let us write the solution x (t ) at the time

x (t ) = e At x 0 + e Aτ

t

as a function of a time-delayed signal:

t −τ

A ( t − s ) − Aτ
 e e Bu ( s)ds +
0

At

= e x0 + e

Aτ

[x(t − τ ) − e

A ( t −τ )

t

τe

A( t − s )

Bu ( s ) ds

t−

,

t

] e

x0 +

A(t − s )

(5.4)

Bu ( s ) ds

t −τ

In general, the time delay τ is an unknown variable. The estimation error of the time
delay is ε = τˆ − τ . The predicted state xˆ ( t ) of the system based on the estimate of time
delay τˆ is given by:

[

t

] e

xˆ (t ) = e At x 0 + e Aτˆ xˆ (t − τˆ) − e A ( t −τˆ ) x 0 +

A(t − s )

Bu ( s ) ds

(5.5)

t −τˆ

where xˆ (t − τˆ) is the estimate of the delayed state given the estimate of the delay τˆ .
It should be noted that x(t − τ ) is what is actually measured and delivered to the plant
model. So, at every instance of time, the values of the variables xˆ (t ) , xˆ (t − τˆ) , ( ), and
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x(t − τ ) are

known to the controller. On the other hand, the current state x (t ) and the time

delay τ are unknown. It is essential that the plant model estimates the state x (t )
accurately. Because of the delay an accurate estimation of x (t ) requires a good estimate
of the delay τ, the next step will show how to estimate the delay τ.
The estimation error in state can be described by em ( t ) = x ( t ) − xˆ ( t ) , and with a delay, it is
given by
em (t ;τ ,τˆ ) = x (t − τ ) − xˆ (t − τˆ ) .

(5.6)

The idea is to estimate τˆ over time as fast as possible so as to minimize the error

em (t;τ ,τˆ) . To do so, we select v = 0.5em 2 . Using the gradient descent method, we set
dτˆ
∂v
= −η ,
dt
∂τˆ

(5.7)

where η is the learning parameter. With some manipulation, we have:
∂e
∂[x (t − τ ) − xˆ (t − τˆ)]
dτˆ
= −ηem m = −ηem
∂τˆ
∂τˆ
dt
t −τˆ

∂xˆ (t − τˆ)
∂  A ( t −τˆ )
= ηem
= ηem
x0 +  e A ( t −τˆ − s ) Bu ( s ) ds 
e
∂τˆ
∂τˆ 
0
.
= ηe m

(5.8)


∂  A ( t −τˆ − s )
Bu ( s ) ds  − ηem Ae A( t −τˆ ) x0
 e
∂τˆ  0

t −τˆ

[

= −ηem Bu (t − τˆ) − e A( t −τˆ ) Bu (0) − Ae A( t −τˆ ) x0

]

Assuming that u ( 0 ) = 0 , which is reasonable for the initial time, we arrive at:
dτˆ
= −η e m Bu (t − τˆ) − Ae A( t −τˆ ) x 0 ,
dt
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0 ≤ τˆ ≤ t

(5.9)

Equation (5.9) is used to estimate the time delay τ . This value is sent to both the
controller and monitoring center to inform them about the occupancy TDS attack in the
system. The alarm strategy is shown in Figure 5.1.
This method was implemented in MATLAB to verify its performance using the LFC of a
two-area distributed power system. In the next section, the simulation results are
presented and discussed in detail.
5.3

Simulation Result, TDS Attack Detection on Smart Grid Application

This section focuses on the LFC system, where the controller’s task is to regulate the
state of a networked power system. The description of a multi-interconnect LFC dynamic
system can be found in Section 4.4.2. Here, we focus on a two-area power system with
the attack model described in the same section (Section 4.2). It should be noted that we
used the same parameter values as described in Table 4.3.
The total simulation time is 50 seconds, and the sampling period is 0.01 sec. In order to
show accuracy of the proposed TDS attack detector, a negative acknowledgment is not
sent to the local controller for the first simulation. The simulation was performed for
three different scenarios: (1) single TDS attack on one power area, (2) simultaneous TDS
attack on both power areas, and (3) complex varied TDS attack on both power areas.
1. Single TDS Attack on First Power Area: For this attack, a hacker attacks the
third state of the first power area at 2 sec for a time delay of 3 sec, and the time
delay is increased to the value of 4.5 sec at 7 sec. Figure 5.2 shows that the
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detector accurately tracked and monitored the TDS attack or any natural delay of
the system.
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Figure 5.2: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for Third State of First Power Area

2. Simultaneous TDS Attack on Both Power Areas: In this scenario, we attacked
the third state of both power areas simultaneously. TDS attacks 1 and 2 were
injected into the first and the second power areas, respectfully. TDS attack 1 is
applied at 2 sec for a value of 3 sec and at 8 sec to the value of 4.5 sec. TDS
attack 2 occurs simultaneously with TDS attack 1 at 1.5 sec and 6 sec. Figure 5.3
shows the results.
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Figure 5.3: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for Simultaneous TDS Attack on Both Power Areas

3. Complex, Varied TDS Attack on Both Power Areas: In the last scenario, a
TDS attack was injected at different times with different time-delay values. It is
assumed that a hacker injects a TDS attack into the feedback lines of both power
areas. In this simulation, an attacker starts a TDS attack on the second power area
(the third state) at time of 1 second for t d 3 = 5s , and then increases it to t d 3 = 10 s at
20 sec. Furthermore, a hacker starts to attack the first power area (third state), at 1
second with t d 8 = 3s , and increased it to t d 8 = 4.5s at 30 seconds. Figures 5.4 and
5.5 show TDS attacks and TDS attack tracking in real time. Figure 5.4 shows a
TDS attack on the third state of the first power area, and Figure 5.5 shows an
attack at the same state of the second power area.
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Figure 5.4: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for the Third State of the First Power Area
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Figure 5.5: TDS Attack Detection and Tracking for the Third State of the Second Power Area

5.4

Conclusion

In summary a simple method for tracking a time-delay switch attack on NCSs was
demonstrated. This method relies on a time-delay estimator that estimates and tracks time
delays introduced by a hacker. The time-delay detector compares the estimated time
delay with the maximum time delay and issues an alarm signal when the estimated time
delay is larger than the tolerable one.
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CHAPTER 6
OVERCOMING STABILITY ISSUES OF A TIME-DELAY SWITCH ATTACK
ON LINEAR NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS
6.1

Introduction

Too much effort has been put into the study of time-delay systems [15, 109, 110]. For
example, Tan [15] proposed a neural network time-delay estimator for a class of
nonlinear systems with time-varying delays, which must be trained off-line and must
work well for periodic reference signals. Li et. al. [109] developed an adaptive control
algorithm to guess random time delays in the Networked Control Systems (NCSs).
Li et. al. proposed an algorithm that updates delay estimation using the gradient descent
method and discovers plant parameters using an improved recursive least square. The
authors asserted that the method is superior to the typical networked predictive control.
However, the method is complex for even the simplest linear system. Furthermore, the
authors did not show the results for time-delay control compensation, or any time track of
variable delays. Yet, another example of time-delay estimation is the method of variable
sampling to compensate for the time delay in a networked control system. A Multi-Layer
Perceptron (MLP) neural network is used to learn the time delay off-line, as well as to
predict its value during the on-line control operation [110]. This method assumes that
time delay is constant, so it cannot be applied to the system under varying time delay
attacks. All of the control methods developed for the compensation of time delays rely on
a controller either robust to a maximum time delay using off-line estimates of time
delays, or approximation of time delayed signals. In this paper, a general method is
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(6.1)

Based on Chapter 5, Equation (6.2) is used to estimate the time delay τ .
d τˆ
= −η e m Bu (t − τˆ ) − Ae A ( t −τˆ ) x 0 ,
dt

0 ≤ τˆ ≤ t

(6.2)

Equation (27) is used to estimate the time delay τ . However, there are practical issues
that need to be considered. Computing machines have finite memory and temporal
resolution. Therefore, Equation (27) cannot be implemented without discrete
approximation and boundedness assumptions. To guarantee the stability of calculations
and limit the memory usage, the following condition must be added, τ < τ max . This
condition will allow the construction of a finite buffer to store the history of u(t ) from t
to

t − τ max .

Also, this will allow for the prevention of a runaway condition on

τˆ

. It should

be noted that if the delay injected by a hacker is more than τ max , a trap condition signal
will be sent to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) center, and the
controller switches it to open the loop control to stabilize the system. This switch is
robust since the controller is equipped with a plant model by which it could predict the
next state.
After designing the delay time estimator, the attention is now on the combination of the
plant model and controller. Let the performance error be e(t ) = r (t ) − x (t ) and the estimate
of the performance error be eˆ(t) = r(t) − xˆ(t) . The PID controller input is defined in terms
of the estimated error as:
t

u (t ) = K P eˆ(t ) + K D

deˆ
(t ) + K I eˆ( s )ds
dt
0



and the optimal feedback controller as
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(6.3)

u (t ) = K eˆ (t )

(6.4)

where KP, KD, KI and K are proportional, derivative, integral and optimal gain
respectively.
The PID controller and optimal feedback controller gains can be designed in normal
operation (with no TDS attacks). More detail on designing PID and optimal controllers
can be found at [111] and [112], respectively.
In this case, the controller was designed to depend on the error eˆ(t) that results from the
estimate xˆ(t) . If the estimate xˆ ( t ) converges to x (t ) , then eˆ(t) converges to e(t) and is
minimized by the controller such that the system x (t ) converges to r(t) . However, this is
not enough. Could xˆ ( t ) be estimated by knowing x(t − τ ) ? This is an important
component in finding a stable controller. To answer this question, consider the following
argument. The plant model estimation equation is given by
xˆ (t ) = Axˆ (t ) + Bu (t )

(6.5)

The delayed equation of the state is
x (t − τ ) = Ax (t − τ ) + Bu (t − τ )

(6.6)

where x (t − τ ) and x (t − τ ) are measured by the plant model, u (t − τ ) is unknown since τ
is not known.
Accordingly, the following equation is constructed
xˆ (t − τ ) = Axˆ (t − τ ) + Bu (t − τ )

(6.7)

The elements of equation (6.7) are unknown because τ is unknown.
Multiply Equation (6.7) by a positive definite constant gain matrix C, and subtract the
resultant Cxˆ (t − τ ) from xˆ ( t ) of Equation (6.5). In this way the following is obtained
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xˆ (t ) = Axˆ (t ) + Cxˆ (t − τ ) − CA xˆ (t − τ )
− CBu (t − τ ) + Bu (t )

(6.8)

Substituting CBu (t − τ ) = C x (t − τ ) − CAx (t − τ ) into Equation (6.8) results in
xˆ (t ) = Axˆ (t ) + Bu (t ) + Cxˆ (t − τ ) − CAxˆ (t − τ )
− Cx (t − τ ) + CAx (t − τ )
= Axˆ (t ) + Bu (t )
− C x (t − τ ) − xˆ (t − τ ) + CA[x(t − τ ) − xˆ (t − τ )]

[

]

(6.9)

= Axˆ (t ) + Bu (t ) − C [em (t ;τ ,τ ) − Aem (t ;τ ,τ )]

Note that the first τ is the actual delay signal that is associated with the delayed signal x(tτ) itself, which is read via the communication channel. This τ is hidden and is not
accessible to the control system. The second τ is associated with the plant estimator and
estimate of the delay signal ̂ and delayed states . Equation (6.9) is stated assuming the
fact that ̂ = . Next, em (t;τ , τ ) is replaced by em (t;τ , τˆ) of Equation (5.6) to obtain:

xˆ (t ) = Axˆ (t ) + Bu(t ) − C[e m (t; τ , τˆ) − Aem (t; τ , τˆ)]

(6.10)

The above replacement makes the current predicted estimate of the plant state xˆ ( t )
dependent on the estimate of the time delay τˆ . In other words, an accurate estimate of the
state depends on an accurate estimate of the time delay. In Equation (6.10), only if
em (t ;τ ,τˆ) − Aem (t ;τ ,τˆ) goes to zero as a result of τˆ converging to τ , then xˆ ( t ) will

converge to x (t ) . This means that the modeling error em should be exponentially damped,
i.e., em (t ;τ ,τˆ) = Aem (t;τ ,τˆ) .
Notice that the method by which the plant estimate is constructed depends on the
measured states of the plant, x (t − τ ) , and the estimate of the state given the estimated
time delay, xˆ (t − τˆ ) . The difference x (t − τ ) − xˆ (t − τˆ) is the modeling error signal
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em (t ;τ ,τˆ) . The choice of the gain matrix C in equation (6.10) is dictated by balancing the

requirements for having the plant model state depend on errors in time-delay estimation
and guarantee that the control system remains stable. More details can be found in [113,
114].
This method was employed in MATLAB and its performance confirmed using a singleinput, single-output system, as well as a LFC control of a two-area distributed power
systems. In the next section, the simulation results are presented and discussed.
6.3
Step 1:

Controller Design Algorithm

Initialize time-delay estimate τˆ , plant model state estimate

x̂

and model

error em. Then, set the learning parameter η to a suitable value. Also, set
the matrix C.
Step 2:

Obtain a plant state measurement (i.e., the sensed states of the plant
x (t − τ )

), which could be time-delayed by τ(t).

Step 3:

Compute the current state estimate, xˆ(t) , using Equation (6.10).

Step 4:

Compute the delayed plant state estimate xˆ (t − τˆ ) based on the model’s
equation and the estimate of the performance error eˆ(t ) = r (t ) − xˆ (t ) and
model error

e m (t ; τ, τˆ ) = x (t − τ) − xˆ (t − τˆ ) .

Step 5:

Compute the time-delay estimate τ̂ , from Equation (6.2).

Step 6:

Compute the control signal ( ). For example,

can be set by using

Equation (6.3) or (6.4).
Step 7:

To prevent runaway conditions bound the control signal by ±umax, use the
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time-delay estimate by τmax and plant model by ±xmax.
Step 8:
6.4

Repeat Steps 2-7 until the estimate of the performance error

ê < ε

.

Simulation Results

A simple single-input, single-output system is considered under a variable time-delay
attack with a variable reference signal. This test is conceived to demonstrate the usability
and efficiency of this method. The simulation model is given by:
x (t ) = −0.7 x (t ) + 2u (t )

1 − e − γ 2t
t ≤ Ta
r (t ) =  − γ ( t − T )
1
b
4e
(sin( 2πω a t ) + 1) otherwise
− λ1t
τ (t ) = T1 e (sin( 2πω 1t ) + 1) + T2 (1 − e − λ2t ) + 1

(6.11)

where the total simulation time T=500 sec. Ta=T/2, Tb=T/2.2, T1=T2=T/10, λ1=0.005,
λ2=0.0005, γ1=0.07, γ2=0.004, ωa=0.06, ω1=0.005 and the sampling period is 0.01 sec.
The proposed PID controller was applied to track the reference signal under a TDS
attack. Figure 6.2 shows the state of the plant in Equation (6.11) as tracking the desired
trajectory r(t). The dotted line is the state of the system, while the other one is the
reference signal. The tracking is almost perfect, even though the time delay varies by τ(t).
Figure 6.3 shows the TDS attack detection and its tracking; the estimated time delay τˆ(t )
tracks the time varying time delay τ(t) that can either be injected by a hacker or occurring
naturally. The dotted line is time-delay estimate, while the other is the TDS attack. Note
that in the first 80 seconds of the simulation of the system operation, the plant is not
tracking the reference signal because the time variable t is less than the time delay τ(t).
For this plant simulation, a PID controller was used with the following parameters KP=5,
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KI=2 and KD=1.5. The time-delay estimator learning rate η=0.32 and the plant model
teacher forcing effort parameter is C=2.
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Figure 6.2: Tracking the Performance of a Single-input, Single-output System under TDS Attack
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Figure 6.3: Time Delay Tracking

The simple, modified model-based control and time-delay estimation works for simple
single-input, single-output systems under variable time-delay attacks; the distributed
power control systems are considered where time-delay mitigation strategies are
paramount. The focal point is the LFC system (mentioned in Section 4.4.2), where the
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controller’s job is to regulate the state of a networked power system. Simulation studies
were conducted to evaluate the effects of TDS attacks on the dynamics of the system.
By solving the Riccati matrix equation, the close loop control is designed in the form of
state feedback. For this simulation, the discrete linear-quadratic regulator design is used
from the continuous cost function called the “lqrd” function in MATLAB 2013a. For
simplicity of discussion,

N = 2 is

set, which is defined as a two-area power system. Table

4.3 shows parameter values used in this process. Since simulation for certain duration
tracks a step load change, we also set both ΔPl1 and ΔPl2 to be zero.

Figure 6.4: An Adaptive Load Frequency Control for a Two-area Power System Which is Robust to the
TDS Attack Using the Modified Method

Scenario 1:

The hacker injects time delays into the second and eighth states at the time of 8 seconds
and 24 seconds for the delay value of 1.28 seconds and 9 seconds, respectively. The LFC
system equipped with the time-delay estimator performs as expected. Power states are
regulated to zero, and the TDS attack is detected and time delay is tracked. Figure 6.5
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shows the detection and track of the time delay, and Figure 6.6 shows all states of the
two-area interconnected power system. As it is clear from the figures, the modified
controller is able to control the LFC distributed system under a TDS attack. In Figure 6.6,
initial delays direct the system away from the stable point, however, shortly after, time
delays are estimated and the controller recovers the regulating power states to zero.
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Figure 6.5: TDS Attack Tracking
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Figure 6.6: All States for Two-area LFC Power System under TDS Attack Using the Modified Optimal
Controller
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Scenario 2:

In this scenario, a TDS attack is injected at 1 second and 3 seconds in time for delay
values of 5 seconds and 7 seconds for the second and the eighth states. Figure 6.7 shows
that the tracking scheme works well and as expected, and could track the TDS attack.
Figure 6.8, Figure 6.9, Figure 6.10, and Figure 6.11 show the simulation results of the
frequency and power deviation of the generator, value position of the turbine, and tie-line
power flow of the first power area with and without the modified control method,
respectively. It shows that the system will be unstable when under a TDS attack, if the
modified method is not applied. In the abovementioned figures, the TOC and MOC
denote the traditional optimal controller and the modified optimal controller, respectively.
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Figure 6.7: Time-Delay Tracking under a TDS Attack
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Scenario 3:

This scenario is exactly the same as the second one, except that 15 percent of disturbance
and noise were added to the system. As it is clear in Figure 6.12, the modified control
technique could detect, track, and control the LFC system during a TDS attack and some
disturbances. Figures 6.13 and Figure 6.14 show the tracking performance of the value
position of the turbine system during a TDS attack for the first and the second power
areas, respectively.
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Figure 6.12: TDS Attack Tracking
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System
2
MOC under TDS Attack and Disturbance
0

X 8 (t)

-2
-4
-6
-8

0

5

10

15
Time (sec)

20

25

30

Figure 6.14: Value Position of the Turbine System during a TDS Attack for the Second Power Area
Control System

6.5

Conclusion

The LTI systems were able to be controlled with variable time delays either occurring
naturally or as a result of a time-delay attack by a hacker. The TDS attack was tracked
with the proposed method. One kind of delay was addressed specifically, that is, the
delay in the observed state of the controlled system. In this paper, only the LTI system in
state feedback was examined. In future papers, research will show that it works for a
class of nonlinear systems.
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CHAPTER 7
CONTROL OF NONLINEAR SYSTEM UNDER A TDS ATTACK:
EVALUATION OF METHODS
7.1

Introduction

In this chapter, several existing common controllers, such as the Model Predictive
Controller (MPC), PID controller, and emotional learning controller (ELC) were
evaluated during a TDS attack. Also, a new simple technique was proposed, called the
“emergency controller,” which overcomes stability issues caused by a TDS attack based
on the TDS detector described in Chapter 4. The emergency controller was applied to the
LFC application described in Section 4.4.2 and evaluated the ELC and other methods on
the 2nd-order heartbeat model described in Section 4.4.3.
For the second application (heartbeat model), the controllability and observability of the
heartbeat model are assumed and discussed in [90]. The nonlinear feedback Emotional
Learning PI Control (ELPIC) technique is proposed in Section 7.2 and discussed in
detail. Finally, we present experiments to verify that this method works well and as
expected. The conclusion shows that this method is powerful enough to track the ECG
signal and is more robust, when it is compared with the other control methods during a
TDS attack or random delay in the sensing loop.
The emergency controller design is described in Section 7.4. The simulation is applied to
a two-area power system with the LFC and shows the simplicity and cost-effectiveness of
this technique.
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7.2

Emotional Learning Controller (ELC)

The emotional learning controller (ELC) was presented by Moren and Balkenious for the
first time. They began the process of evolving to evolve computational models for parts
of the human brain that carry out emotional functioning. In [115], a new computational
model of brain emotional learning included the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, thalamus,
and sensory cortex, as shown in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Scheme of Brain Emotional Learning Model

The amygdale is a small unit in the brain, which is involved in emotional evaluation of
the stimuli. These emotional states and reactions derive “alarm signals” and “motor
control commands.” Some of the inherent exciters such hunger, pain, certain smells, etc.,
can excite the amygdale. The amygdale responding to these stimulants is used in
learning. On the other hand, the orbitofrontal cortex plays a role of a modifier of
inappropriate responses and reactions of the amygdale. Numerous experiments on
patients with damaged orbitofrontal-cortex revealed that they are not able to adapt
themselves to new conditions [116], in the other words, previous learning does not let
them understand and respond to new conditions.
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The ELC consists of two sections that carry out the learning section and control section:
one corresponds to information processed by the amygdala, and the other by the
orbitofrontal cortex. Basically, input stimuli (signals) are processed and used to gain
control of coefficients (synaptic efficacies) to affect the future process of stimuli and
motor control commands. By ignoring some of the details in Figure 7.1, the
computational emotional learning model of amygdale-orbitofrontal is shown in Figure
7.2.

OOC

OM

OA

Figure 7.2: Overall Computational Model of ELC

The output of the computational model can be found as:
OM = OA − OOC

(7.1)

where OM is the model output, OA and OOC are the amygdale and the orbitofrontal cortex
unit output, respectively.
The outputs of the amygdale and orbitofrontal units are described by:
OA = G A ⋅ I S

(7.2)

OOC = GOC ⋅ I S

(7.3)
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where GA is the amygdale gain,

IS

is the sensory input, and GOC is the orbitofrontal

cortex gain. The amygdale and orbitofrontal learning laws can be modeled as:

where

I PR

ΔGOC = k1 ⋅ (OM − I PR )

(7.4)

ΔG A = k 2 ⋅ Max{0, I PR − O A }

(7.5)

is the primary reward, and k1 and k 2 are the rates of learning related to

orbitofrontal and amygdale, respectively.
The Equation (7.5) shows that the amygdale learning uses max operation. Therefore, the
amygdale gain is forced to have a consistently increasing deviation. This emphasizes the
physiological fact of the amygdale unit which records what it learns.
Now, let us use Equations (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3) to find a general formula:
OM = (G A − GOC ) I S

(7.6)

Based on the above equation, we can conclude that the output for of the amygdaleorbitofrontal unit in the emotional learning system depends on the amygdale and
orbitofrontal gains, and the sensory inputs. It should be noted that these gains depend on
the primary reward signal.
In this chapter, the sensory input of the emotional learning system is formulated with a
format similar to the self-tuning PID:



t

I S (t ) = K P e(t ) + K D e(t ) + K I e(t ) dt
0
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(7.7)

where K P , K D , and KI are the proportional gain, the derivative gain, and the integral gain,
respectively. The signal e(t ) is the difference value between the reference value and the
output value at any time instant. However, to get a better response in front of noise, PI
was used instead of PID as the sensory input to the amygdale-orbitofrontal emotional
learning system. The next section will show how this controller improves the
performance of the system in the attack operations and tracks the reference ECG signal
very well.
7.3

Simulation Result Based on ELC Controller: Evaluation of Methods

The 2nd order heartbeat model was simulated to track the ECG signal using the ELPIC.
Then, an external TDS attack or random feedback delay is applied to the model from a
start time tS until a final time t F to show the performance of the ELPIC. This is compared
with the classical PID and the MPC.
Figure 7.3 shows the ECG reference tracking X 2 (t ) using the ELPIC. The line shows the
output of the model controlled by the ELPIC, and the dotted line indicates the patient’s
ECG referenced signal [95]. The result shows that the ELPIC tracks the reference signal
accurately.
The TDS attack or feedback delay is applied to the model from t S = 0.4 seconds until
t S = 0.45 seconds,

with the time-delay of τ = 0 . 01 seconds. For the purpose of visual

comparison, the attack period and the amount of attack are selected as a lower level. Due
to the larger period and time-delay value, the classical PI and MPC controllers move out
of visual boundaries. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 compare the ELPIC with the classical PI and the

110

MATLAB’s MPC. The results clearly show that the ELPIC is more robust during a TDS
attack or unwanted random feedback delay.
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Figure 7.3: Simulation Result of ECG Tracking for Second-Order Heartbeat Model Based on ELPIC
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of the ELPIC and the MPC for ECG Tracking during a TDS Attack

In summary, the ELC applied to Zeeman nonlinear heart model is able to track the ECG
signal with a high level of reliability. Furthermore, the robustness of the ELC’s ability to
control the Zeeman heart model under a time-delay switch attack was demonstrated. The
stability and control of the operations are evaluated. We have also demonstrated that ELC
is more robust than other common control schemes, such as the classical PID and the
MPC.
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7.4
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Figuree 7.6: Block Diagram of Propposed Control Technique
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t

de
u ( t ) = K P e (t ) + K D
(t ) + K I  e( s ) ds
dt
0

(7.8)

u (t ) = Ke (t )

(7.9)

where the error is e(t ) = r(t ) − x(t ) . Either controller, i.e., the PID or the optimal controller,
can be designed to be robust to some maximum time-delay τ stable . The emergency
controller sits close to the plant and operates only in case of emergency such as an attack
on the communication line between the plant and controller. The emergency controller
could either be a PID controller or optimal controller with the goal to stabilize the system
to a particular reference trajectory rE.
Suppose there is a time-delay attack on the system with delay τ . The time-delay
estimator estimates the delay for

τ̂

. The delay estimator is described in Chapter 5. The

cyber-attack detector will use the time-delay estimate to perform the following function
1 τˆ > cτ stable
D=
0 otherwise

where

,

(7.10)

is a constant between 0 and 1. In case D=1, an alarm signal is sent to the

controller to shut it down, and a negative acknowledgement is sent to the emergency
controller to stabilize the plant. The control strategy is shown in Figure 7.6.
The emergency controller method was implemented with MATLAB and its performance
was studied using the LFC of a two-area distributed power system. In the next section,
the simulation results are discussed in detail.
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7.5

Simulation Result and Conclusion Using Local Controller-Based Design

The simulation was conducted on the LFC described in Section 4.4.2 for the proposed
emergency controller described in Section 7.4.
The assumption is that a hacker injects a TDS attack into the feedback lines of both
power areas. In this simulation, an attacker starts a TDS attack to the second power area
(the third state) at time 1 second for td 3 = 5s , and then increases it at 20 seconds for
td 3 = 10 s .

Furthermore, a hacker starts to attack the first power area (third state), at 1

second with td 8 = 3s , and increases it to td 8 = 4.5s at 30 seconds. We also set the
τ stable = 0.4 s based on the stability analysis of the LFC system in Section 4.4.2. The

negative acknowledgment (neck) is then sent to the emergency controller in the case
where the detected value of the time delay is larger than the maximum time delay.
Figures 7.7 and Figure 7.8 show the third state of the first and the second power areas
under attack with a traditional optimal controller (TOC) and proposed control technique
(PCT), respectively. It is clear from the results that the simulated attack makes the system
unstable. The proposed technique, however, can overcome a TDS attack on the simulated
system.
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System

In summary, a simple and cost-effective method for overcoming the stability effects of a
TDS attack on NCSs has been successfully demonstrated. The method relied on a timedelay estimator that estimates and tracks time delays introduced by a hacker. With
knowledge of the maximum time delay of the control system, for which the plant remains
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stable and secure, the time-delay detector compares the estimated time delay with the
tolerable time delay and issues an alarm signal when the estimated time delay is larger
than the tolerable one. It also directs the system to an alarm state. In an alarm state, the
plant is under the control of the emergency controller, local to the plant. The plant
remains in this mode until the networked control system state is restored and the timedelay switch is eliminated.
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CHAPTER 8
CF-TDSR: A CRYPTOGRAPHY-FREE TDS RECOVERY PROTOCOL
8.1

Introduction

In recent years, the security of control systems has raised many important research
questions. For instance, NCSs, which are used to monitor and control systems distributed
over a wide area, are a groundbreaking approach to control systems used in power
systems. Modern power grids depend on computers and multi-purpose networks for
operation. This renders them vulnerable to attacks, including high-profile cyber attacks
[21, 78, 117, 118] that have a potentially major societal impact.
TDS attacks delay the transmission of measured signals from the plant output to the
controller. Most communication algorithms have proposed the use of timestamps to
address naturally occurring delays in the communication between plants and their
controllers in the NCS [119, 120]. However, timestamping is not effective against TDS
attacks, since the attackers can manipulate both the data and the timestamps.
Consider, for instance, a hacker that can manipulate both the data content and the
timestamps of telemetered information (sensed from the output sensor). The data sent to
the controller consists of a sequence of points of the form (t , x(t )) , where x(t) denotes the
state of the plant at time t. The attacker can modify this data in one of several ways. First,
manipulate the timestamps, i.e., send (t − d , x(t )) . Second, delay the state values, i.e., send
(t , x (t − d )) . Third, change both the timestamp and the data, i.e., send (t − d 1 , x (t − d 2 )) .

Finally, the attacker can simply drop the packets.
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Cryptographic solutions may be used to detect such attacks. For instance, the packets can
be authenticated, e.g., using keyed hashes (e.g., HMAC), and computed using a key
shared only by the controller and the plant. Even if the cryptographic constructs are fast
and will introduce only small delays and computing overhead, they are unable to recover
from denial of service (DoS) attacks, or to recover data delayed or destroyed by the
hacker. The controller will be forced to request the retransmission of the lost or corrupt
packets, leading to additional delays and a higher network load that can destabilize the
entire system.
In this chapter, the adaptive channel allocation techniques are leveraged, along with the
state predictors and time-delay detectors to address the challenges introduced by TDS
attacks. Adaptive resource allocation techniques and channel adaptive methods provide
substantial improvements and robust performance under many benchmarking metrics
[121]. These methods utilize an adaptive allocation of communication resources as the
channel conditions change with time [122].
The Cryptography-Free TDS Recovery (CF-TDSR) is introduced in this section, which
requires the controller to first compare the received timestamp against an internally
generated value. The CF-TDSR requires time synchronization between the plant and the
controller. If a discrepancy is detected, then the telemetered information is discarded. The
controller instead uses the predicted state, generated by a state predictor. If the data has
been delayed, the controller compares the value of the measured states against an
internally predicted value of states. If the difference exceeds a predetermined threshold,
the controller drops the packet and uses the estimated state instead. In both cases, the
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controller sends a command signal to the data measurement unit to transmit the next data
sets over multiple channels.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, relevant work is described. In
Section 8.3, the system and hacker model are provided, along with TDS attacks. The LFC
system is introduced, and the adaptive allocation method is used to demonstrate
mechanisms to restore stability after a time-delay attack. In the following section, a
special type of TDS attack is modeled as a DoS attack. In Section 8.4, the CF-TDSR is
introduced and its ability to eliminate the effects of time delay attacks is demonstrated. In
Section 8.5, the simulation results are presented and discussed.
8.2

Related Works

In this chapter, the main focus is on the role of the NCS application in power systems.
The control of the NCS in power systems with time delays has been previously explored
[21, 78, 96, 107, 108, 123, 124].

The researchers, however, considered either the

construction of controllers that are robust to time delays or controllers that use offline
estimation. At this time, there seem to be no control methods and adaptive
communication protocol that implement an online estimation of dynamic time delays and
real-time control of power systems to overcome TDS attacks.
The stability of power control system controllers with time delays was studied in [99103]. The author of [104] studied the stability eﬀects of delays to the smaller signal
power systems. References [99] and [100] proposed methods to reduce oscillations
resulting from time-delayed feedback control. Paper [105] introduced a wide-area control
system for oscillations of a generator. Based on phasor measurements with delays, a
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novel controller was suggested in [96] and the power system’s small signal stability was
considered. In [106], a feedback controller for power systems with delayed states was
proposed. The controller addresses the combined effects of the instantaneous as well as
delayed states using the quadratic Lyapunov function.
Related work on time delays was discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. In conclusion, control
methods developed to compensate for time delays rely either on a robust controller to a
maximum time delay, on off-line estimates of time delays, or on approximations of timedelayed signals. In this chapter, a general method for the control of systems experiencing
TDS attacks was also proposed. The CF-TDSR applies to continuous linear timeinvariant systems.
8.3

A Unified Approach

In this section, a unified approach to model a specific case of TDS attacks as DoS attacks
is proposed. Then, techniques will be investigated that address TDS attacks. Consider a
LTI system described by
x = Ax + Bu + w
u = − Kx

where

x ∈ Rr

and

u ∈ Rn

(8.1)

are state and control functions, respectively. Matrices A, B and K

are constant with appropriate dimensions. The w∈ Rn is an n-dimensional zero-mean
Gaussian white noise process. Suppose that a TDS attack occurs with probability p .
Subsequently, the result is
( A − BK )x(t ) + w(t ) 1 − p
x (t ) = 
p
 Ax(t ) − BKx(t − τ )
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(8.2)

To simplify this explanation, in (8.2), it is assumed that the same probability of attack
occurs on different channels and states. If a TDS attack occurs, packets are dropped.
Then, Equation (8.2) is formulated in the form of a DoS attack, as follows
( A − BK )x(t ) + w(t ) 1 − p
x (t ) = 
Ax(t ) + w(t )
p


(8.3)

Let us calculate expectation value of x in (8.3) as:
 ( A − BK )E{ x (t )}
E{ x (t )} = 
 (1 − p )
 + E{w (t )}

+ [AE { x (t )} + E{w(t )}]

Let

μ (t ) = E{ x (t )} ,

then we can write (8.4) as
μ (t ) = [( A − BK )μ (t )](1 − p) + Aμ (t ) p
= ( A − (1 − p) BK )μ (t )

where

E{w(t )} = 0

(8.4)

(8.5)

.Next, the stability of Equation (8.5) is investigated. For the system

described in (8.5) to be stable, the mean should be bounded. Therefore, this equation
must have:
{ A − (1 − p ) BK < 0}

(8.6)

A − BK + pBK < 0

(8.7)

hence,

i.e.,

A − Bk + pBK

must be a negative definite when the controller is stable, and the next

result must have
A − BK < 0

(8.8)

To satisfy stability, condition (8.7) must be made similar to (8.8). To do this, two
defenses are introduced. First, the probability of a TDS attack on the communication
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channel is decreased. Second, the controller gain is changed. In the following probability
equations, both cases are described.
Decrease TDS Attack Probability.
( A − BK )x (t ) + w(t ) 1 − p l
x (t ) = 

Ax (t ) + w(t )
pl

(8.9)

Equation (8.9) will take the following form:
A( BK )−1 − I + ( pI )l < 0

(8.10)

A( BK ) −1 − I < A( BK ) −1 − I + ( pI ) l < A( BK ) − 1 − I + pI < 0

(8.11)

Therefore, we get:

The condition in Equation (8.11) shows that if l > 1 channel is allocated to increase the
redundancy of transmitted plant data, the total probability of faults will decrease as a
result of a TDS attack. Also, we will be able to bring the controlled system closer to its
original state, i.e., A-BK < 0. Therefore, by adaptively adding another communication
channel(s), the LFC system can be stabilized. The cost of channel redundancy limits the
number of communication channels that can be added to address TDS attacks. The
alternative is to change the controller gain. The second approach shown below illustrates
how this can be accomplished.
Change Controller Gain. Changing the controller gain K to stabilize the NCS is

proposed. The new controller gain parameter is set to be K p = K / (1 − p ) . In this case, a
limited number of channels only need to be added. However, adjusting the controller gain
K is subject to how well the probability of attack p is estimated. In Section 8.4, this
control methodology is described in detail.
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8.4

CF-TDSR: A Crypto-Free TDS Recovery Protocol

In this section, we introduce the CF-TDSR, a communication and control protocol that
thwarts TDS attacks on networked control systems. The CF-TDSR leverages methods to
detect time delays introduced by a hacker. The CF-TDSR consists of the following
components (see Figure 8.1, for the system diagram). First, the smart data transmitter
(Tx) adaptively allocates transmission channels on demand. Second, the plant model
estimates the current plant states and helps stabilize the network controlled system when
under attack. Third, the time-delay estimator continuously estimates the time delays on
the channels. Fourth, the time-delay detector determines if delays are detrimental to the
system. In this case, it will issue commands to inform the transmitter (plant) and
controller. The last component is the proportional-integral-derivative (PID) or optimal
controller to control the system (control block in Figure 8.1). The CF-TDSR will detect
and track time delays introduced by a hacker and guide the plant to track the reference
signal to guarantee system stability.

Figure 8.1: Block Diagram of CF-TDSR

The CF-TDSR is flexible and is able to support communication between the plant and the
controller with and without timestamps. In the case where timestamps are used, the
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controller compares the controller clock and the packet time stamp and the state of the
plant with the state predicted by the plant model. If there are any differences, the packet
is dropped. If this is the case, the controller sends a negative acknowledgment (NACK)
signal to the communication transmitter to use an adaptive channel allocation. Finally, the
controller uses the state predicted by the plant model instead of the state received in the
packet to control the system while it waits for the corrected packet.
In the case where timestamps are not used, the time estimator continuously estimates time
delays while the plant model determines the appropriate plant state values (Chapter 5
described the time-delay estimation, and Chapter 6 described the state estimation for
controller). If the estimated time delays are longer than the tolerable time delay, or if the
plant state estimates are very different from the received plant states, the communicated
packet is dropped. Similar to the previous case, in this case, the controller signals the
communication transmitter to use adaptive channel allocation and uses its internal state
estimates for control. In this way, by using the adaptive channel allocation and the robust
plant state estimator, the controller is able to thwart TDS attacks.
The functionality of the delay detector elaborated above can be captured with the
following mathematical formula
1
D (t ) = 
0

(tc − t s

)

(

)

> τ stable or em (t ) > ε or (τˆ ≥ τ stable )
otherwise

(8.12)

where D(t) is the time-delay detection function, tc is the time value of the clock
maintained by the controller, ts is the timestamp of the packet generated at the transmitter,
and τstable is the maximum tolerable time delay, for which the system remains in the stable
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region. Its value can be calculated from the eigenvalues of the system, for example,
finding the eigenvalues of LFC, as shown in Section 4.4.2. The difference between the
transmitted state of the plant x(t) and the plant estimator record of the system state
e m ( t ) = x ( t ) − xˆ ( t )


x (t )

is

. The parameter ε is the tolerable error value. Since a TDS attack occurs

with probability p, then D=1 with probability p and D=0 with probability 1-p. Equation
(8.12) enables the detection of TDS attacks irrespective of the use of timestamps, and
even if the timestamps are modified by the hacker. In the next section, each CF-TDSR
component will be examined and discussed and detail.
We use Equation (5.9) to estimate the time delay, τ , considering that computing
machines have finite memory and temporal resolution. Therefore, we are unable to
implement Equation (5.9) without discrete approximation and boundedness assumptions.
To guarantee the stability of calculations and limit the memory usage, the following
condition, τ < τ max must be added. This condition will allow for a construction of a finite
buffer to store the history of u(t ) from t to t − τ max . Also, this will allow us to prevent a
runaway condition on
8.5

τˆ

.

Simulation Results and Discussion

8.5.1 TDS Attack on LFC Model

Consider a LFC system of the form:
x (t ) = Ax (t ) + Bu (t ) + w (t )

with the optimal controller given by:
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(8.13)

 − Kx (t ) 1 − D (t )
u (t ) = − Kxˆ (t ) = 
D (t )
− Kxˆ (t )

(8.14)

where D (t ) is a digital random process. D(t) is 1 when a TDS attack is detected (see
Equation (8.12)), and is zero otherwise. TDS attacks are detected by comparing the
received timestamp from the plant against the controller time, or by using the time-delay
estimator. The new state estimate, xˆ (t ) , is given by:
 Ax (t ) + Bu (t ) 1 − D (t )
xˆ (t ) = 
D (t )
 Axˆ (t ) + Bu (t )

(8.15)

Let the estimation error be em (t ) = xˆ (t ) − x(t ) . The dynamics of the closed loop can be
calculated as:
( A − BK )x (t ) + w(t )
1 − D (t ) and em (t ) = 0

x (t ) = 
−
−
+
(
A
BK
)
x
(
t
)
BKe
(
t
)
w
(
t
)
D (t )
m


(8.16)

We now investigate the stability of Equation (8.8). We want the mean of the estimation
error em(t) converge to zero, for a reasonable stability criteria, and for the covariance of
em(t) to remain bounded. If em(t) bounds the covariance, the state x(t) remains stable. We
compute the total expectation value over both x(t ) and D (t ) , knowing that D (t ) = 1 with
probability p , when there is an attack on one channel. Thus, we can express the equation
of the system under attack as:
( A − BK )x (t ) + w(t )
1− p

x (t ) = 
−
−
+
(
A
BK
)
x
(
t
)
BKe
(
t
)
w
(
t
)
p
m


Therefore, the total expectation yields:
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(8.17)

μ (t ) = ( A − BK ) μ (t )(1 − p )
+ ( A − BK ) μ (t ) p − BKμ m (t ) p
= ( A − BK ) μ (t ) − BKμ m (t ) p

(8.18)

Let us now assume we add l channels to the communication channel. Hence, we have:
μ (t ) = ( A − BK ) μ (t ) − BKμ m (t ) p l

If the term

BKμ m (t ) p l

(8.19)

is zero, (8.19) will converge to zero and the system will be stable.

Therefore, the idea is to make that term as small as possible by choosing a large l , or by
using a good estimator for the system that can make this term closer to zero or bounded.
If the delay injected by the hacker exceeds τ max , a trap condition signal will be sent to the
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) center.

Then, the controller

switches to open the loop control to stabilize the system. This switch is robust, since the
controller is equipped with a plant model through which it can predict the next state.
8.5.2

Simulation of CF-TDSR on LFC System

Simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of CF-TDSR experiencing TDS
attacks. The discrete linear-quadratic regulator design from the “lqrd” continuous cost
function (MATLAB 2013a) is used to generate the optimal control law for the system in
normal operation. The two-area power systems are modeled, as described in Section
4.2.2. Table 4.3 shows the parameter values used in the simulation, based on practical
values and literature [21, 78]. Also, ΔPl1 and ΔPl2 = 0 is set, and the sampling time is set to
0.01sec.
The goal of the simulation is to determine the ability of the CF-TDSR to quickly respond
to the TDS attacks. The total simulation time is set as 50 seconds. The example assumes a
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powerful hacker that has access to the communication channel. The hacker starts the TDS
attack with values of τ = [t d1 t d 2  t dn ]T . Each power area has five states. Since the twopower-area systems, n, are considered in this equation, the total number of states in the
interconnected model is 10. Consider that the attack starts at time t a .
The simulation is performed in three main scenarios: single power plant attack,
composite TDS attack, and simultaneous composite TDS attack on a noisy system and
limited available channel.
Single Plant TDS Attack

In the first investigation, a hacker has access only to the first power area, and can only
launch TDS attacks on the specific channel. The existence of multiple channels that the
CF-TDSR can allocate is assumed, but the demonstrated method only needs a limited
number of channels. A powerful hacker can launch multiple and sequential TDS attacks.
Figure 8.2 shows the results of the experiment. Figure 8.2(a) describes the attack that was
launched: the red dashed line denotes a TDS attack on the first channel that occurs at time
1-3 seconds with a delay of 4 seconds, followed by a TDS attack on channel 2 between 34 seconds with a delay of 2.5 seconds (blue dashed line), then a TDS attack on channel 3
between 9-20 seconds (green dashed line), and a TDS attack on channel 4, with a delay of
9 seconds, from time 25 seconds to 50 seconds. Figure 8.2(b) shows that the CF-TDSR
detects each attack and requests a change of channel. The attack on channel 4 is not
effective, because the system has already approached the stable region. The conclusion is
that when the system is at optimal value (close to zero), it is more difficult for the TDS to
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destabilize the system and force the CF-TDSR to request an additional channel.
Furthermore, the CF-TDSR quickly detects the attacks on different channels.
Figure 8.2(c) shows the frequency deviation,

Δf

K

, of the power system. Figure 8.2(d)

shows the power deviation of the generator, Δf gK . Figure 8.2(e) shows the value position
of the turbine,

Δ f tuK

. Figure 8.2(f) shows Tie-line power flow, Δf pfl . These figures are

proof that the states remain stable and converge to zero under a TDS attack. Figures
8.2(c)-8.2(f) compared a scenario where the state estimator is on (CF-TDSR, the red line)
to the results of a scenario where the state estimator is off (black dashed line) with an
unlimited number of communication channels. In both cases, the time-delay estimator
and channel adaptation are on. The figures show that the CF-TDSR is clearly superior.
The results show that the cost function value is improved, ΔJ = 5.21 , when the state
estimator is running and take cares of the TDS attack until a new channel is added to the
system.
Composite TDS Attack

In the second investigation, a case is simulated where a hacker attacks the third state of
the first and the second power areas. In this scenario, only two communication channels
are available. The third state of each area provides the feedback and is ideal for the TDS
attack. The attack starts at t a = 1 second for the first power area, and at t a = 3 seconds for
the second time area, with time-delay values of t d 3 = 1.5 seconds (the third state of the
first plant) and t d 8 = 3 seconds, respectively. Figure 8.3(a) illustrates the TDS attack that
was implemented.

130

The behavior of the LFC distributed power system under attack in three scenarios was
evaluated. The first scenario called the “Baseline” runs without any modification to the
communication protocol and to the controller. The second scenario called the “Adaptive”
evaluates the LFC under the attack using an adaptive communication protocol. The third
scenario evaluates the LFC system using the CF-TDSR, i.e., using both the adaptive
communication protocol and controller design defenses.
In Figure 8.2, the x axis denotes the time. (a) Illustration of a sophisticated, sequential,
and multi-channel attack: Each of the 4 bumps corresponds to a TDS attack launched on
a different channel. (b) Evolution in time of CF-TDSR: The time when the CF-TDSR
detects each attack, and requests to change the channel. The attack on channel 4 is not
effective because the system has already approached the stable region. (c) The frequency
deviation of the power system during the attacks. (d) The power deviation of the
generator during the attacks. (e) Evolution in time of the value position of the turbine
during the attacks. (f) Tie-line power flow during the attack. Figures 8.2(c) to 8.2(f)
compare the CF-TDSR (red line) to a version where the state estimator is off (black line).
The CF-TDSR greatly improves over a state estimator-free version.
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Figure 8.2: TDS Attack on one Power Area

Figure 8.3 shows that the CF-TDSR is capable of detecting the TDS attack, and of
quickly adapting the communication protocol. Note that when the CF-TDSR detects a
delay larger than 0.4 sec, it sends a NACK to the sender, as suggested by the study of
eigenvalues for the stability of the system [4]. Figure 8.3 (b)-(f) shows the frequency
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deviation, the power deviation of the generator, the value position of the turbine, and the
tie-line power flow of the first power area, respectively. The figure shows that the system
becomes stable only when using the CF-TDSR. The results show that the CF-TDSR
works very well, even with strict limitations on the number of available channels, when
all states converge to zero as expected.
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Concurrent TDS Attack for the Noisy System and Limited Available Channel

In the final experiment, the system behavior under the noise is studied. In order to
accomplish this, first, 20% of white Gaussian noise is added to the communication
channel. Then, a TDS attack is launched on both power areas: The attacker
simultaneously launches the attack on the third state of both the first and the second
power areas at time 1 second and 4 sec, with a 2-second delay. Then, the delay value is
increased at time 7 sec to the value of 5 sec and 6.5 sec. In this experiment, the
availability of a single communication channel is assumed. This assumption severely
restricts the CF-TDSR’s options. Figure 8.4 shows that even under such restrictions, the
CF-TDSR is able to accurately detect and prevent the noise-based TDS attack. More
specifically, Figure 8.4 (a) shows how the CF-TDSR detects and tracks the TDS attack in
real time. Figures 8.4 (b) and 8.4 (c) show the third state of the first and second power
areas under the noise-based TDS attack. They show that the CF-TDSR performs very
well, even in the absence of additional communication channels.
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8.6

Conclusion

Industrial control systems share information via a variety of communication protocols,
making them vulnerable to attack by hackers at any infrastructure point. In this article,
the time delay attacks were the main focus. The CF-TDSR, a communication protocol
that uses adaptive channel redundancy techniques, was developed, as well as a novel state
estimator to detect and obviate instable effects of a TDS attack. It was demonstrated that
the CF-TDSR enabled the linear time-invariant control systems to achieve stability. The
simulation experiments show the CF-TDSR enabling the multi-area load frequency
control component to quickly stabilize the system under a suite of TDS attacks.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
9.1

Conclusion

Based on a literature review and reviewing various types of attacks and failures in NCSs,
it was found that the security of industrial control systems is very important and should
be studied by researchers. Important fundamental knowledge about NCS and the security
of those systems was discovered, a general attack model for the NCS was introduced.
In the third chapter, the time-delay effects of an SVPWM-based switching pattern for a
grid-connected three-phase current source inverter were studied.

An algorithm was

proposed to track the time delay in real time to overcome the effects of time delays
produced in the sensing loop. This guarantees synchronization between the grid phase
and inverter output. An observer state feedback controller was applied to overcome the
effects of time delays in the control signal. An optimal control design for systems with
natural time delay was studied to show that controlling such systems is quite complex and
is the reason most researchers ignore time delay in their control design process.
In the following chapter, a new type of attack is introduced, called the TDS attack, to the
NCS. The stability analysis of a NCS during a TDS attack is studied mathematically, and
the effects of TDS attacks on two different applications are simulated. First, the LFC
power system under a TDS attack was modeled using hybrid systems, and the TDS
attacks are formulated as switch action “Off/Delay-by-τ” sensing channels or control
inputs. Then, the destabilizing action of TDS attacks on power systems was studied by
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using methods from hybrid systems theories. A two-area LFC LTI model was simulated
to evaluate the effects of TDS attacks. The results show that TDS attacks affect the
dynamic performance of the LFC system, and in many cases, could destroy the system’s
stability, which can be launched at any time during the operation of the power system.
For the second application, we applied a TDS attack on a wireless pacemaker, and then
simulated the results by creating a nonlinear dynamic model of system. We showed that
TDS attacks can cause stability issues in NCS.
Afterward, a method to track and detect the TDS attack on NCS was proposed. This
detection method was used to alert monitoring centers like SCADA, as well as to
overcome stability issues of TDS attacks in the following chapters. Based on this
detection method, a simple method for preventing a time-delay switch attack on
networked control systems was demonstrated. The method relied on a time-delay
estimator that estimates and tracks time delays introduced by a hacker. With knowledge
of the tolerable time delay of the control system, for which the plant remains stable and
secure, the time-delay detector compares the estimated time delay to the tolerable time
delay and issues an alarm signal when the estimated time delay is larger than the tolerable
time delay. It also directs the system to an alarm state. In an alarm state, the plant is under
the control of the emergency controller, local to the plant. The plant remains in this mode
until the networked control system state is restored and the time-delay switch is
eliminated. This method is simple and is an inexpensive way to assure that an industrial
control system remains stable and secure.
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In the Chapter 6, the ability to control LTI systems with variable time delays either
occurring naturally or as a result of a time-delay attack by a hacker was demonstrated.
The ability to track TDS attacks with the proposed method described in Chapter 5 was
also demonstrated. One specific type of delay, that is, the delay in the observed state of
the controlled system, was addressed. The only system that was examined was the LTI
system in state feedback. This method is general, and in the future, further research will
show that it works for a class of nonlinear systems.
In the last chapter, a new protocol called CF-TDSR was proposed to overcome TDS
attack effects on NCSs. The CF-TDSR was developed, which is a communication
protocol that uses adaptive channel redundancy techniques and a novel state estimator to
detect and obviate the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks. The CF-TDSR enabled the
linear time invariant control systems to achieve stability. The proposed protocol on the
LFC system was simulated, and the simulation experiments showed that CF-TDSR
enables the multi-area load frequency control component to quickly stabilize following a
suite of powerful TDS attacks.
9.2

Future Works

In this research, we focused on TDS attacks injected into the NCS and specialty feedback
lines where a plant sends output signals to the controller through a communication
channel. In the future, the effects of TDS attacks on different parts of NCS, such as the
control signal and referenced signal, will be studied. A TDS attack might cause stability
and ineffectual issues in NCSs that should be adjusted based on other control systems.
Delaying the reference signal could cause stability problems for all control systems.
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A general attack model for NCSs was introduced; however, only TDS attacks were
studied. Future research will involve studying a combination of attacks such as DoS, TDS
and FDI attacks. In this case, a primary requisite is the classification of attacks; another
important requisite is to design a controller to be robust under these combinations of
attacks. It is believed that the extension of the proposed method will stabilize the NCS
under a combination of attacks or other types of attacks.
A method to detect and track TDS attacks on LTI systems was proposed. Additional
future work will involve the extension of the TDS attack detection method for nonlinear
systems. Subsequently, a nonlinear system will not need to be linearized, hence, the
results would be more accurate.
The last recommendation for future work involves an extension of the proposed protocol
to reduce and optimize the number of extra communication channels necessary by
changing the transmission sampling time. This technique allows the controller to obtain
the necessary information with less delay. Hence, this work needs an optimization
algorithm to allocate other communication channels and/or change the sampling time of
the transceiver and receiver with the cost and time savings in mind.
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